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SUMMARY
The objective of this thesis is to deepen understanding of the role of information
in multi-agent biological and social systems, and to identify ways that information
can be influenced in order to produce a desirable outcome. These systems consist
of a population of individual decision makers whose individual interests align with
a common goal. Individuals may only have access to a limited amount or certain
types of information and hence make only partially informed decisions. The global
outcomes in these systems are therefore primarily determined by how information is
distributed across the population.
We investigate the role information plays in three distinct multi-agent systems
that appear in biological and social contexts. First, we study noisy communication
in social dilemmas of cooperation. We analyze a game of incomplete information to
identify the circumstances under which information sharing between players promotes
coordination. Such social dilemmas are central to the study of evolutionary biology,
microbial cooperation and competition, and collective animal behavior. Second, we
study how individual awareness helps reduce the spread of a disease in a networked
population. The individuals receive partial information about the epidemic through
socially local as well as global sources, and take social distancing measures. We
evaluate the dynamical behavior, and find desirable distributions of these information
sources that mitigate the severity of an epidemic. Third, we consider how information
and incentives can be influenced to promote the conservation of public resources. Self-
interested individuals consume public goods with limited restraint, potentially leading
to a tragedy of the commons. We formulate optimal control problems to allow an
influential entity (e.g. the media, public figures) to perturb a population’s perception
xvi
of the environmental state, with the objective of maximizing the accumulation of
public goods over time. Using a suitable optimal control algorithm, we numerically




A multi-agent system is comprised of an interacting population of individual, au-
tonomous, and informed decision makers. Collectively, the individuals produce com-
plex global behaviors. Three important examples of multi-agent systems in biological
and social contexts are the dilemmas of cooperation, the spread of disease in a popu-
lation, and the utilization of public resources. Central to the operation and dynamics
of these three systems is the flow of information.
Information can be defined as any source or process that ellicits a functional
reaction from its receiver [49]. It allows individuals to take strategic actions to protect
their own interests. Information comes in many forms - knowledge, cues, signals,
opinions, and combinations thereof. How information is distributed or exchanged
among the agents determines their individual actions, ultimately leading to a global
outcome. Therefore, information is a primary factor to understanding interactions
and behaviors in complex systems.
The objectives of this thesis are to analyze how the distribution of information in
the three aforementioned multi-agent systems drives decision-making and dynamics,
as well as to identify ways to influence the distribution in order to steer the dynamics
to a desirable outcome. By studying the role of information in these systems, this work
furthers understanding in their respective application domains - evolutionary biology,
epidemiology, and game theory. In particular, 1) we highlight the importance of
information sharing as a factor for cooperation in social dilemmas, 2) the combination
of epidemic information and social distancing alone is insufficient to eradicate an
epidemic, and 3) the influence of public opinion can help conserve common resources.
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Below, we provide the context and motivation for studying the role of information in
these three settings.
1.1 The role of information in collective behavior
Groups of organisms across the animal kingdom exhibit cooperative behavior to sur-
vive and thrive in uncertain and fluctuating environments. They accomplish this
despite selfish incentives to defect and despite imperfect informational capabilities
[10, 23, 24]. A theoretical understanding of why collective behaviors emerge and are
maintained starts at the individual level. How does the social context of the group
interaction influence decision making at the individual level? What information does
an individual have to base its decision on?
A notable example that highlights these features is quorum sensing in bacteria.
Quorum sensing is a cell-to-cell communication system that operates by secreting
and sensing signaling molecules called autoinducers [63, 41]. Quorum sensing allows
bacteria to collectively respond to changes in their environment. Bacteria are highly
social organisms, able to both sense the environment directly as well as to send
and receive autoinducer signals. Once a cell detects a threshold concentration of
autoinducer molecules is reached, indicating sufficiently high local cell density, it
responds by activating gene expression. The benefit of group coordination relies
on the participation of many cooperating cells. Cooperative behaviors such as the
formation of biofilms, bioluminescence, motility, and secretion of virulence factors are
facilitated by quorum sensing systems [63, 120, 67, 26].
How and why quorum sensing systems in bacteria have evolved remains largely
unexplored [67, 86, 121]. Beyond the microbial world, decision-making in collective
animal groups balance both private and socially obtained information [5, 64]. For
example, honeybees and ant colonies alike aggregate privately obtained and social
signals to collectively decide upon the best nesting site [32]. Swarming behaviors in
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ants, fish, and birds are a result of decentralized communication and decision-making
[22]. The underlying principles of observed collective decision-making processes is
the subject of ongoing research [22, 100]. Motivated by these questions, our work
rigorously addresses the relationship between social communication and individual
decision-making strategies in group coordination social contexts. We accomplish this
by analyzing a coordination game where each player is uncertain about the envi-
ronmental state through sensed and shared signals, where we characterize the Nash
equilibria and fitness maximizing strategies. Of note, we find one novel “majority
logic” strategy that exploits social information to maximize cooperation - only in the
scenario where players have access to both private and shared information.
The results presented for this work (Chapter 2) are currently under review for jour-
nal publication. A pre-print [74] can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1101/268268.
1.2 Mitigation of epidemic spreading through awareness
With the widespread availability of social media and news outlets on the internet and
television, individuals may be well-informed about the current state of ongoing disease
epidemics and how to take precautionary measures to avoid getting sick. In the recent
2009 H1N1 Influenza pandemic, people responded to public service announcements by
increasing the frequency of washing hands, staying at home when they or loved ones
were sick, or avoiding large public gatherings [105]. In the 2014 Ebola outbreak in
West Africa, a combination of quarantining and sanitary burial methods were shown
to significantly reduce the rate of virus spread [80]. These precautions and social
distancing actions effectively limit epidemic spread. Individuals’ distancing actions
depend on the extent of how informed they are. The dissemination and exchange
of information influences the public’s behavior, affecting the course of the epidemic
itself, which in turn affects the public’s behavior again [35, 14]. This feedback loop
allows epidemic spreading to coevolve with information and human social behavior,
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inducing complex dynamics not observed by studying each process in isolation. A
better understanding of what these complex dynamics are can help inform more
effective implementations of public health campaigns and epidemic control strategies.
Models of epidemic spreading over networks have rapidly advanced in the last 15
years [114, 62], but human behavioral elements and the role of information in epi-
demics are only beginning to be studied in the same mathematical framework [33].
In this work, we formulate a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model by consider-
ing a networked population that receives dynamically distributed information about
the epidemic from two sources. Individuals are partially informed about both the
infection status of their local social contacts and of the population, and follow social
distancing actions based on their personal information. We analyze the equilibrium
and long-run properties of this system and compare these results to the benchmark
models (no awareness). We find that awareness and social distancing reduces the
endemic equilibrium state, but is insufficient to eradicate an epidemic. Through sim-
ulations, we find that local contact information is crucial in slowing the spread of an
epidemic.
The results presented for this work (Chapter 3) are published [75, 76, 77].
1.3 Opinion influence for conservation of public goods
A “tragedy of the commons” [40] is a scenario where the selfish, myopic interests of
individuals can eventually lead to the depletion of a shared common environment or
public good. These situations are prevalent among social and biological systems across
scales [20, 82, 90, 89]. The growing human population intensifies these concerns. By
the year 2100, the United Nations estimates the world population will reach 11.2
billion1 . This calls into question society’s ability to support this projected number,
given current consumption rates and detrimental effects on the environment due to
1http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/world-population-projections/
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human activities [20]. Fisheries are experiencing reductions of 83% in population size
[46] over the last 50 years, primarily due to overfishing.
To prevent such tragedies from occurring, researchers in the social sciences have
called for interventions from a variety of instituions in society [73, 8, 113]. Infor-
mation plays an important role in these interventions. Raising awareness through
environmental activist movements as well as educating the public about current envi-
ronmental conditions is necessary to effect change [82]. However, the efficacy of these
proposed solutions are rarely tested using realistic quantitative models [73, 82]. In
this thesis, we provide such an analysis by building upon a recent model of game-
environment feedback dynamics [119] to include public opinions. We model the influ-
ence a central entity has on public opinion through information and incentive control
policies that seek to conserve the environmental state. Using optimal control algo-
rithms, we numerically characterize locally optimal policies that achieve this objec-
tive. We find that these policies encourage an “oscillating tragedy of the commons”
[119], where the environment cycles between replete and deplete states. This resulting
dynamic is undesirable in many cases, as it destabilizes the state of the commons.
The material presented for this work (Chapter 4) are both published [119] and




THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN COLLECTIVE
BEHAVIOR
In stochastically fluctuating environments, organisms modify their behavior to in-
crease their chances of growth and survival. For instance, bacteria can sense the
extracellular state of resources, toxins, and even the presence of other bacteria. In-
dividual cells can then rapidly change their behavior, i.e. their “phenotype”. Such
stochastic phenotype switching may be random and unrelated to sensed cues - this
strategy is known as bet-hedging. Or, such stochastic phenotype switching can be
adaptive, and directly in response to sensed cues - this strategy is called phenotypic
plasticity [57, 84]. However in many circumstances, the chance that one cell grows
or survives depends critically on the behaviors of other cells. In those circumstances,
coordination of behavior with others directly influences survival.
In bacteria, some cooperative behaviors are facilitated by quorum sensing, a cell-
to-cell communication system in which individual cells secrete and sense autoinducer
molecules to obtain information about the environment and to gauge local cell den-
sity [63, 41]. Quorum sensing can induce formation of biofilms for protection against
a host’s immune system, secretion of virulence factors to consolidate colonization of
the host, motility, and many others [120, 67, 26, 9]. In honeybee and ant colonies,
individuals process and share information to collectively reach an informed collective
decision about the best nesting site [32, 87]. The individual-level mechanisms that
produce collective behaviors in animal groups is an area of ongoing research [22, 100].
Inspired by these examples, the aim of this chapter is to develop a game-theoretic
framework in which to study the individual-level decision-making processes which
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produce collective behavior under environmental uncertainty and noisy communica-
tion.
There is an extensive body of work on individual (as opposed to group) decision-
making in fluctuating environments [84, 57]. In many scenarios, an individual must
match its phenotype or behavior to changing conditions by using sensory cues from
the environment, signals from other individuals in the population, or both [54, 53, 93,
27, 28]. An individual employing the optimal bet-hedging strategy diversifies behav-
iors at frequencies that mirror the posterior knowledge of environmental fluctuations.
These results quantify an information-theoretic connection between the optimal fit-
ness value and the amount of information about the environment available to the
individual. However, the resulting optimal individual fitness is independent of the
actions of others in the population. Hence, these models do not address the interplay
between information and collective decision-making in fluctuating environments. In
bacterial quorum sensing, the autoinducer signaling molecules that individual cells
send serve as social cues that indicate local cell density [63, 67, 86]. Substantial ex-
perimental research has been done in recent years to unravel the mechanisms of this
complex communication system. Nonetheless, questions remain regarding why such
communication systems are utilized, particularly from an evolutionary standpoint
[121].
Game theory offers a framework to explain rational behaviors when an individ-
ual’s well-being depends on the actions of others in the population. To understand
the role of communication in collective decision-making under uncertainty, we recog-
nize there are two components to the decision-making process: 1) a communication
system, or the way individuals acquire information and 2) strategies, or the way indi-
viduals use acquired information to make a decision. In this vein, two recent works
have attempted to understand the role of communication in group coordination from
a game-theoretic perspective. In both studies, the players’ strategies are assumed to
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be fixed while the communication systems are evolvable. [79] studies the evolutionary
outcomes of communication systems in an N -person volunteer’s dilemma game, where
all players adopt a majority rules strategy. [19] consider how the choice of commu-
nication systems affect levels of cooperation between two populations of microbes in
an information exchange game. In that model, each individual follows a bet-hedging
strategy.
Complementary to these studies, in this chapter we seek to find the optimal strate-
gies that promote coordination given the limitations of a fixed, noisy communication
system. We study a two-player, two-action game in which the environment stochas-
tically switches between two possible states. The state determines the game payoffs,
and players must coordinate on the correct action corresponding to the environment.
We study two versions of this game in order to highlight the value of information
sharing. In the first, players only receive a private cue from the environment. In the
second, players receive a shared social cue in addition to their private cue. In doing
so, we find three optimal strategies that emerge given variation in information fidelity.
Most notable is a ”majority logic” type strategy that is optimal when environmental
sensing has intermediate reliability, and information sharing is very reliable. As we
show, this allows an individual to act upon their inference of the environmental state
when it is validated by social information.
2.1 A coordination game in fluctuating environments
We consider a two action, two player game that is played repeatedly in stages t =
1, 2, . . .. We denote the set of players N ≡ {1, 2} with generic member i, and the
set of actions X ≡ {A,B}. At each stage t, the environment E(t) takes one of two
possible states, eA or eB. If E(t) = eA then E(t + 1) = eB with probability vAB,
and if E(t) = eB then E(t + 1) = eA with probability vBA. We assume that E(1)
is arbitrarily determined and the switching probabilities vAB > 0 and vBA > 0 are
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fixed. Hence, the environmental state evolves according to a two-state Markov chain
that spends a fraction vA ≡ vBAvBA+vAB and vB ≡
vAB
vBA+vAB
of time in states eA and eB,
respectively. Once E(t) is determined, players select their actions xi(t) ∈ X . They do
not know E(t) with certainty, and the state E(t) governs the players’ utility functions
at each stage. We are interested in the average long-term fitness of the players given
the stochastically switching environment.
Before defining long-term fitness, we define the game that is played at each stage
as follows. Both must coordinate on action A (B) if E(t) = eA (eB) to receive a
payoff bA > 0 (bB > 0). If they miscoordinate, or if they coordinate on the incorrect
action, the payoff is zero. The environment-dependent payoff matrices are illustrated
in Figure 2.1. Note that the payoff value to either player is the same. Thus, a generic
player’s utility function is defined as




bA if x1 = x2 = A and E(t) = eA
bB if x1 = x2 = B and E(t) = eB
0 otherwise
(2.1)
Given the realization of the environment E(t), a normal form game is played at stage
t between the set of players N equipped with action set X , and with utility function
U(·, ·, E(t)). We denote this by the triple G ≡ (N ,X , U(·, ·, E(t))) (this follows
standard game-theoretic notation to denote normal-form games). In the following
two subsections, we introduce two models where players receive noisy information
about E(t), and present our definition of long-term average fitness.
2.1.1 The game Gp with environmental sensing
At each stage t, suppose each player (i = 1, 2) independently senses the environment
E(t) by receiving a private cue αi(t) ∈ {eA, eB}. The cue αi(t) matches the true























Figure 2.1: After each stage, the environment stochastically switches between eA and
eB and determines the payoff matrix. In eA (eB), players need to coordinate on the
A (B) action to receive a positive payoff bA (bB).
1− p.




p if X = Y
1− p if X 6= Y
, X, Y ∈ {eA, eB}
Thus, αi(t) is the output of a binary noisy channel of fidelity p, NC(p), whose input
is E(t). We will refer to the parameter p as the sensing fidelity.
A strategy is a mapping from the set of cues {eA, eB} to the set of actions X .
In other words, a strategy is a contingency plan or policy that a player adopts that
assigns the action to take upon receiving a particular cue. Hence, it is a description
of how a player makes informed decisions. Since there are two possible cues and
two actions, each player can choose among 22 = 4 strategies. We assume player i
chooses only one strategy si, which is fixed for all stages t = 1, 2, . . .. For notational
convenience, we will denote a strategy by an ordered two-vector whose entries are
either A or B. For instance, si = [A,B] denotes the strategy where i plays action A
when αi(t) = eA and action B when αi(t) = eB. Additionally, we write si(eA) = A
and si(eB) = B. We denote the set of all four strategies S4.
The list of all four strategies is given in Table 1. They are read “Only A” (OA),
“Follow Cue” (FC), “FC bar” (FC), and “Only B” (OB).
Remark 2.1. These strategies, with the exception of FC, can be classified as a max
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Table 1: List of all strategies in the game with no information sharing.
αi/ si sOA sFC sFC sOB
eA A A B B
eB A B A B
likelihood estimate of the environmental state, depending on the environmental switch-
ing probabilities vA, vB and private cue fidelity p. Specifically, the strategy
sMLE(αi) = arg max
X=A,B
P (E = eX|αi)
is precisely OA (vB < p < vA), OB (vA < p < vB), or FC (vA < p, vB < p). In this
chapter, we omit analysis of the sMLE strategy because it simply corresponds to one
strategy in Table 1 for any given set of parameters.
When p = 1/2, sFC and sFC reduce to the strategy that uniformly randomizes
between A and B.
A measure of long-term fitness is the fraction of time the players coordinate on
the correct action, weighted by the benefits bA and bB accordingly. We calculate this
measure as follows. Consider the environment E(t), which we recall evolves according
to the two-state Markov chain with stationary distribution (vA, vB). Additionally, the
players’ cues are drawn independently of each other, but conditionally on the state
E(t). Since neither the cues nor player actions affect the environment switching
probabilities, the fraction of time spent in the aggregate state (α1, α2, E) is given by
the following stationary distribution




vAP (α1|eA)P (α2|eA), if E = eA
vBP (α1|eB)P (α2|eB), if E = eB
. (2.2)
For instance, the value of the stationary distribution πp at the entry (eA, eA, eB) is
vAp(1 − p). We define the average long-term fitness as the expected utility with
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bA, bB , or 0
Figure 2.2: Diagram of the game with no information sharing Gp. At stage t, each
player independently senses a cue αi(t) directly from the environment E(t) through
a binary noisy channel with fidelity p, NC(p). That is, αi(t) = E(t) with probability
p, and αi(t) 6= E(t) with probability 1 − p. Player i’s strategy si(αi(t)) determines
its action xi(t) ∈ {A,B}. The payoff U(x1, x2, E) to both players is either bA, bB,
or 0, which is determined by the current actions of both players and the current
environment. The environmental state stochastically switches to E(t + 1) at stage
t+ 1.
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πp(α1, α2, E)U(s1(αi), s2(αj), E). (2.3)
Via (2.3), we define the normal form game Gp ≡ (N ,S4, fp) played between players
N equipped with strategy space S4, and with utility function fp for a given sensing
fidelity p ∈ [1/2, 1]. Figure 2.2 shows a diagram of the communication system un-
derlying Gp. We can represent Gp with the following 4× 4 payoff matrix of long-term
fitnesses fp(s1, s2),





sOA cA cAp cAp̄ 0
sMLE cAp (cA + cB)p
2 (cA + cB)pp̄ cBp
sMLE cAp̄ (cA + cB)pp̄ (cA + cB)p̄
2 cB p̄
sOB 0 cBp cB p̄ cB
(2.4)
where p̄ ≡ 1− p and
cA ≡ bAvA and cB ≡ bBvB
are the relative benefits of each environmental state. An expression to calculate each
entry of (2.4) is given in the Appendix 2.A. Note the payoff matrix is symmetric,
which gives 10 unique strategy profiles. Therefore the identity of the players do not
matter.
Remark 2.2. The average long-term fitness (2.3) can also be viewed as the ex-ante
expected utility in the one-shot Bayesian game Bp consisting of the set of players
N , action set A, external states {eA, eB}, type space {eA, eB}, utility U (eq. (2.1)),
beliefs P (α1, α2, E), and a common prior on E, P (eA) = vA and P (eB) = vB. The
ex-ante expected utility is defined as the expectation of U with respect to the belief
P (α1, α2, E), which is the induced probability distribution over the aggregate state
of the world and coincides with (2.2). In an ex-ante setup, players evaluate their
13
utilities before receiving their signal αi, and therefore must reason about the possible
environmental states, the signal of the other player, and its own signal. The (normal
form) Nash equilibrium solution concept applied to the game Gp coincides with the
definition of ex-ante Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of Bp. A Bayesian Nash
equilibrium describes a state of rationality where no player can profitably deviate by
changing its strategy given its belief of the world. We focus our attention on the
normal-form formulation Gp in this chapter, keeping in mind that a Nash equilibrium
in Gp can also be interpreted as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Bp. A treatment of
Bayesian games can be found in Ch. 6 of [111].
2.1.2 The game Gpq with information sharing
The game Gp is extended by allowing players to share their private cues with each
other before deciding on an action. At stage t, after players sense αi(t), player i
sends a social cue βj(t) to player j (j 6= i), which matches i’s private cue αi(t) with
probability q ∈ [1/2, 1].




q if X = Y
1− q if X 6= Y
, X, Y ∈ {eA, eB}
Thus, βi(t) is the output of a binary noisy channel of fidelity q, NC(q), whose
input is αj(t). We will refer to parameter q as the sharing fidelity. We assume here
that players signal honestly, i.e. each player attempts to share their true private cue.
This is a reasonable assumption because the players’ interests are aligned - they must
attempt to coordinate. In different contexts where player interests conflict, dishonest
signalling becomes a rational alternative. For example, male fiddler crabs with inferior
claws can bluff fighting ability to ward off other males [11].
Player i’s information is now composed of the pair yi(t) ≡ (αi(t), βi(t)) ∈ {eA, eB}2.
Similarly for this model, a strategy is a mapping from the set of information pairs
14
















bA, bB , or 0
Figure 2.3: Diagram of the game with information sharing Gpq. At stage t, each player
independently senses a private cue αi(t) directly from the environment E(t) through
a binary noisy channel with fidelity p, NC(p). Then, each player receives a signal βi(t)
from the other’s private cue through a separate noisy channel of fidelity q, NC(q).
Given player i’s information (αi(t), βi(t)), its action is determined by its strategy,
si(αi(t), βi(t)) = xi(t). The payoff U(x1, x2, E) to both players is either bA, bB, or 0,
which is determined by the actions of both players and the current environment. The
environmental state stochastically switches to E(t+ 1) at stage t+ 1.
{eA, eB}2 to actions, so i can now choose among 42 = 16 strategies. We repre-
sent strategies as ordered four-vectors whose entries are A or B. For instance,
si = [A,B,B,A] is the strategy where i plays action ai = A when yi = (eA, eA),
B when yi = (eA, eB), B when yi = (eB, eA), and A when yi = (eB, eB). We note
that the four strategies available in Gp are also strategies in this game. They are now
represented by the vectors sOA = [A,A,A,A], sFC = [A,A,B,B], sFC = [B,B,A,A],
sOB = [B,B,B,B]. These four strategies base decision-making either on no infor-
mation at all (OA and OB), or only on the private cue αi (FC and FC). The 12
new strategies base decisions on both private and shared signals. The set of all 16
strategies is denoted S16.
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Similarly to (2.2), we calculate the average long-term fitness by considering the ag-
gregate state (y1, y2, E), which occurs a fraction of the time according to the following
stationary distribution




vAP (y1, y2|eA), if E = eA
vBP (y1, y2|eB), if E = eB
.
One can expand P (y1, y2|E) = P (α1|E)P (α2|E)P (β1|α2)P (β2|α1). For instance, the
value of the stationary distribution at the entry ((eA, eA), (eA, eB), eA) is vAp
2q(1−q).




πpq(y1, y2, E)U(s1(y1), s2(y2), E). (2.5)
Via (2.5) and following the arguments from Remark 2.2, we define the normal form
game Gpq ≡ (N ,S16, fpq) played between the set of players N equipped with strategy
space S16, and with utility function fpq for a given pair of sensing and sharing fidelities
(p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2. Figure 2.3 shows a diagram of the communication system that
underlies Gpq. An expression to calculate each entry of the resulting 16×16 symmetric
payoff matrix is given in Appendix 2.A. Given the symmetry of the payoff matrix,
there are 136 unique strategy profiles. A summary of all relevant parameters that
define the games Gp and Gpq is listed in Table 2.
Remark 2.3. We note that the payoff matrices of Gp and Gpq are symmetric. Hence,
the identity of the player (player 1 or 2) does not matter. Such games fall into the
class of potential games [66, 98]. A game is a potential game if the incentives of
the players align with a global potential function. Here, the change in payoff from a
unilateral deviation of a single player is equivalent to the change in global potential,
given all other players remain the same. In our formulation, the potential function is
the average player fitness, or welfare.
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Table 2: List of parameters that define the games Gp and Gpq.
Parameter Description Notes
eX environmental state, X = {A,B}
p environment sensing fidelity ∈ [1/2, 1]
q sharing fidelity ∈ [1/2, 1]
αi private environment cue for player i ∈ {eA, eB}, i = 1, 2
βi social cue player i receives from player j ∈ {eA, eB}, j 6= i
bX payoff of coordinating in eX, X = {A,B} > 0
vAB, vBA prob. of switching to eB from eA, vice versa both ∈ [1/2, 1]
vX fraction of time spent in eX, X = {A,B} vA + vB = 1
cX relative payoff of coordinating in eX = vXbX
κ ratio of relative payoffs = cA/cB
2.2 Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers
We consider the Nash equilibrium solution concept and fitness maximizing strategies
as notions of rational and optimal behavior, respectively. The comparison of the
fitness maximizing strategies between the two models (Gp and Gpq) presented offers
a principled way to investigate the role of sensing and communication in collective
decision-making in systems such as quorum sensing.
Specifically, we are interested in how the quality of the communication system,
defined by the parameter p for Gp and (p, q) for Gpq, dictates which strategy profiles are
Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers. A Nash equilibrium is the classical solution
concept in game theory which describes a rational steady-state configuration where
no player has an incentive to deviate from its strategy. A Nash equilibrium in Gp is












2) ≥ fp(s∗1, s2)
(2.6)
for all s1 ∈ S4, s1 6= s∗1, and for all s2 ∈ S4, s2 6= s∗2. A strict Nash equilibrium is
a Nash equilibrium satisfying (2.6) with strict inequality. We say a strategy profile
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(ŝ1, ŝ2) is a fitness maximizer at p if it satisfies
fp(ŝ1, ŝ2) = max
s1,s2∈S4
fp(s1, s2).
The same definitions above apply for Gpq, where fp is replaced by fpq, and S4 by S16.
In our coordination game formulation, due to the fact that fp or fpq is the fitness value
to both players, the following fact holds: In Gp and Gpq, the fitness maximizer(s) is
necessarily a Nash equilibrium.
However, the converse is not true. We note that in our model, there is no fitness
cost to having higher sensing and sharing fidelities p and q. Our aim is not to inves-
tigate such evolutionary tradeoffs, but to identify the types of strategies that ensure
coordination in fluctuating environments given that the players utilize a communica-
tion system of quality (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2.
2.2.1 Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers in Gp
The base game G (see Eq. (2.1)) admits a single strict Nash equilibrium at the correct
coordinated action. We might expect the game Gp, represented by (2.4), also has a
coordination structure. That is, the players are better off if they coordinate on the
same strategy in S4. In other words, they should play the same action given they
receive the same signal. We can show that this intuition is indeed correct and state
the following result.
Proposition 2.1. For p ∈ [1/2, 1], all Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers of Gp
are necessarily symmetric strategy profiles, i.e. s∗1 = s
∗
2.
The proof, which we show in Appendix 2.B, of this result relies on exhaustively
showing that for any asymmetric strategy profile, one player can switch to the other
player’s strategy to improve the fitness fp. This means that any entry (i, j) below the
diagonal in (2.4) is exceeded by (i, i), (i, j), or both. Due to this result, we can limit
our analysis to the four symmetric strategy profiles. To refer to symmetric strategy
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profiles (s, s) for the four strategies we simply write “OA” to denote (sOA,sOA), and
similarly for the other three.
We find that OA and OB are always Nash equilibria regardless of the value for
sensing fidelity p and the relative benefits cA, cB. We find that FC is not a Nash
equilibrium for any set of parameters. Figure 2.4 (left) illustrates the Nash equilibrium
region of FC. We can characterize the equilibrium region of FC in the game Gp with




is the ratio of relative benefits cA to cB. This is possible by normalizing the fitness,
fp/cB, and applying (2.6) to solve for the region’s conditions on p and κ.
Figure 2.4 (right) illustrates the regions where OA, OB, and FC are fitness maxi-
mizers. While OA and OB are Nash equilibria everywhere, there is a unique fitness
maximizer (OA,OB, or FC), except for on the boundaries dividing each region, for
any given (p, κ) value in [1/2, 1] × (0,∞). On the boundary lines, the fitnesses of
the two strategy profiles that are separated coincide. We note here that the region
where FC maximizes fitness is a subset of its Nash equilibrium region. This reveals
some points in the parameter space where FC is a suboptimal Nash equilibrium to
the OA/OB strategies.
The fitness for FC increases quadratically in p: fp(FC) = (cA + cB)p
2. Hence,
with higher sensing fidelity, players are better able to infer the correct environmental
state and select the correct action. The p2 term appears because each player is
independently sensing E, and coordination depends on both players independently
receiving the correct cue which occurs with probability p2. The value of employing
FC diminishes as κ→∞ or 0. In either extreme, one environment is favored over the
other. Either one occurs far more frequently over the long run, or its coordination
benefit outweighs that of the other state. Hence, players do best by adopting either
OA or OB instead of FC in these situations. FC is most desirable when κ ≈ 1, where
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Figure 2.4: Characterization of strategies in the no information sharing game with
respect to the parameter space (p, κ) with κ = cA
cB
ranging in log scale from -5 to 5.
Log scale is used to show symmetry between the ranges 0 < κ < 1 and κ <∞. The
quantity κ is the ratio of relative benefits between environment eA and eB. (Left) The
region where FC is a strict Nash equilibrium : 1−p
p
< κ < p
1−p . The strategies OA and
OB are Nash equilibria everywhere. (Right) Disjoint regions where the strategies OA,
















< κ < p
2
1−p2
either the environment fluctuates frequently and bA ≈ bB, or a rare environment
offers an enormous coordination benefit compared to the other. These are situations
where acting on knowledge of the environment is most crucial. By playing OA or OB,
players miss out on half of the fitness benefit opportunity whereas players employing
FC are able to adapt to changing conditions.
Variants of sFC are often identified as the optimal strategy that maximizes long-
term fitness in fluctuating environments when individual fitness is uncoupled to the
actions of others. They are often referred to as responsive switching [53], adaptive
plasticity [29], and proportional betting [27]. In our model, the social context of
coordination renders it suboptimal when private information is unreliable (low p),
though it is still optimal for sufficiently high values of p.
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2.2.2 Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers in Gpq
We now turn to the game Gpq = (N ,S16, fpq). The Nash condition remains the same
as in (2.6), except the long-term fitness is now given by fpq (2.5). In comparison to
Gp, the parameter space of the information sharing game Gpq has another dimension,
the social fidelity q. We search for the Nash equilibrium strategy profiles and fitness
maximizers of Gpq over the parameter space (p, q, κ) ∈ [1/2, 1]2 × (0,∞). First, we
observe that unlike Gp, the coordination structure in the new set of strategies S16
is not preserved in Gpq. That is, not all Nash equilibria are necessarily symmetric
strategy profiles for all (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2. This means we cannot restrict our search
for Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers to symmetric strategy profiles. Indeed,
we find that the asymmetric strategy profile (s1, s2) with s1 = sFC = [A,A,B,B]
and s2 = [A,B,A,B] is a Nash equilibrium in a region of low sensing fidelity p and
high sharing q. We refer the reader to Appendix 2.C where we derive its equilibrium
region.
There are 136 unique strategy profiles (by symmetry). In Figure 2.5, we display
the multiplicity of Nash equilibria across the range of fidelity parameters p and q.
Here, we do not count OA and OB because they are always Nash equilibria. We find
there is an abundance of Nash equilibria in the upper left region of the parameter space
(p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2, where private information is unreliable but information sharing has
high fidelity. This suggests reliable social cues are utilized as a means to coordinate
(see Section 2.3 for further discussion).
The strategy profiles that maximize fitness are shown in Figure 2.6 in the param-
eter space (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2 and for cross-sections of κ. We note that the set of fitness
maximizers consist only of symmetric strategy profiles. We find that OA, OB, and FC
are fitness maximizers, along with a new type of strategy we term “Majority Logic”
(ML). When environment A is favored (κ > 1), MLA appears as a fitness maximizer,
21
Figure 2.5: The number of Nash equilibria not including OA or OB, that exist across
fidelity values (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2, for κ = 1 (Left) and κ = 10 (Right) in the game
Gpq. The data is numerically calculated by sweeping through (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2 in a
uniform grid of spacing .001, and exhaustively verifying whether each 136 strategy
profile satisfies its Nash condition. We verify whether a strategy profile is a Nash
equilibrium or not by using a simplified expression of the Nash condition that is
amenable to numerical evaluation, given in Appendix 2.C.
and similarly MLB when κ < 1. These strategies are written
sMLA ≡ [A,A,A,B]
sMLB ≡ [A,B,B,B].
Recall that in our strategy vector notation, [A,A,A,B] is the strategy where the
player chooses action A when yi = (eA, eA), action A when yi = (eA, eB), action A
when yi = (eB, eA), and action B when yi = (eB, eB). The majority logic strategies
MLA and MLB were not previously available in Gp. Their fitnesses increase quadrat-
ically in q, and their functional forms given in Appendix 2.A.
The notation MLA,MLB differentiates which action is assigned, A or B, to the
cues yi = (eA, eB) and (eB, eA), i.e. the middle two entries in the strategy vector. We
will write just “ML” when generally speaking of the majority logic strategies (e.g.
when κ = 1). Figure 2.9 plots the fitness surfaces of ML and FC.
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Figure 2.6: Three classes of strategies emerge as the fitness maximizers in Gpq : 1)
the pure strategies OA and OB, 2) follow cue (FC), and 3) majority logic (MLA
and MLB). The regions are drawn by first sweeping (p, q) ∈ [1/2, 1]2 in a uniform
grid with spacing .001, and exhaustively searching all 136 strategy profiles for the
fitness maximizer. Each grid cell is then filled with the unique color corresponding to
the fitness-maximizing strategy profile. Upon observing the emergence of the three
strategy classes, the boundaries are analytically solved by equating their fitnesses.
Hence, results are accurate within a spacing tolerance of .001. (Left) When κ = 1,
players do not prefer any environment over the other. Hence, OA and OB give the
same fitness value and we indicate this by OA/OB (similarly for MLA/MLB). (Right)
When κ 6= 1, the region boundaries are the same for both 5 and 1
5
but the fitness
maximizer is either OA or OB, depending on whether κ is greater or less than 1,
respectively (similarly, either MLA or MLB).
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The region where the ML strategies maximize fitness is characterized by inter-
mediate sensing fidelity p and high sharing fidelity q. The shared cues βi are highly
accurate so each player will have reliable knowledge of the other’s private cue. Our
interpretation of why ML thrives in this regime is as follows. With reliable infor-
mation sharing, players can detect when their private cues agree and when they
disagree. Consider sMLA = [A,A,A,B]. When they believe both of their private cues
match the correct environment (e.g. y1 = y2 = (eA, eA) w.p. p
2q2), they choose the
correct action. When they believe their private cues disagree with each other (e.g.
y1 = (eA, eB) and y2 = (eB, eA) w.p. p(1 − p)q2), they decide to coordinate on the
predetermined action A, whether or not it is the correct action. These situations will
occur far more frequently than players obtaining polarized beliefs (e.g. y1 = (eA, eA)
and y2 = (eB, eB) w.p. p(1− p)(1− q)2), where they miscoordinate actions.
The sMLA strategy vector [A,A,A,B] differs from sFC = [A,A,B,B] and sOA =
[A,A,A,A] by only one bit, whereas sFC differs from sOA by two bits (similarly for
sMLB and sOB). Thus, we interpret sML to be a hybrid of sFC and sOA. It acts as an
estimator of the environment when the posterior belief on the environmental state
is very high, i.e. when yi = (eA, eA) or (eB, eB). This is the reasoning for the term
“Majority Logic”. Players act upon their inference of the environmental state only
when their private information is validated by social information. Otherwise, when
yi = (eA, eB) or (eB, eA), the posterior is not as high and the player disregards its
information altogether, blindly playing action A.
2.2.3 The fitness value of information sharing
Majority logic stands alone among all possible strategies in Gpq that can outperform
the fitness maximizers of Gp (OA, OB, and FC). However, recall from Figure 2.6 (Left,
for example) that it requires the sharing fidelity q to be sufficiently high for a fixed
sensing fidelity p. This critical threshold value, which we call qc(p), is the value of q
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above which the majority logic strategy is the fitness maximizer. Hence, the values of
qc(p) are parameterized by the boundary lines that separate the ML strategies from
OA/OB and FC in Figure 2.6. Full parameterizations of qc(p) are given in Appendix
2.D.
The critical thresholds qc(p) when the ML strategies outperform the optimal
strategies of Gp suggests there is no value for players to share signals unless sharing
fidelity is sufficiently high, q > qc(p). Higher sharing fidelity is needed for extreme
values of p : qc(p) increases up to 1 as p decreases towards 1/2, as well as when
p increases towards 1. When p is near 1, players prefer FC because they are able
to independently detect the correct environment with very high probability and act
accordingly. When p is near 1/2, private cues are effectively random because they
contain no information about E. Consequently, the shared signals are also effectively
random. Players then receive any of the four signals yi with equal probability. By
employing ML in this regime, players will miscoordinate more often than they would
if they committed to OA or OB.









be the maximum fitness attainable in Gpq at (p, q, κ). Then we define the fitness value
of information sharing as
V (p, q, κ) ≡ Fpq(κ)
Fp(κ)
,
which gives the ratio of the maximum fitness in Gpq to the maximum fitness in Gp with
the parameters (p, q, κ). By definition, V (p, q, κ) = 1 for q ≤ qc(p). In other words,
there is no fitness benefit to sharing signals when q does not exceed the threshold
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Figure 2.7: The fitness value of information sharing V (p, q, κ). (Left) When κ = 1,
the maximum value of V is attained at (p = 1/
√
2, q = 1, κ = 1), where information
sharing leads to approximately a 41% increase in fitness over no sharing. (Right)





, q = 1).
Figure 2.8: The maximum value of information sharing Vmax(κ), which is the value of
V (p, q, κ) attained at q = 1 and p = 1/
√
1 + κ when κ < 1 and p =
√
κ/(1 + κ) when
κ ≥ 1. The peak of fitness improvement occurs when no environment is favored over
the other (κ = 1), where there is an improvement ratio of
√
2. The value for Vmax is
fpq(MLB)/cB when κ < 1, and fpq(MLA)/cA when κ > 1 (they coincide when κ = 1).
The fitness improvement ratio degrades as κ → 0 or ∞, i.e. when one environment
is favored over the other.
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qc(p). A contour map of V is shown in Figure 2.7. When κ = 1 (Figure 2.7, Left),
V is maximized at p = 1/
√
2 and q = 1, giving Vmax =
√
2 (use Eq. (2.9) and
divide by cB). Thus, information sharing improves fitness by approximately 41%
when the environment fluctuates frequently. For κ > 1, it is maximized at q = 1,
p =
√














if κ > 1
√








if 0 < κ < 1
and is plotted in Figure 2.8. As κ→ 0 or∞, the improvement ratio Vmax degrades as
one environment becomes favored over the other. In these extreme scenarios, either
OA or OB become optimal for increasingly larger regions.
We also note that V (p, q, κ) increases quadratically in q for q > qc(p). Hence, the
rate at which V increases with respect to q, dV
dq
, increases linearly in q. This is due
to a majority logic strategy being the fitness maximizer in this region. We also note
that V (p, q, κ) decreases as p deviates away from the intermediate value
√
κ/(1 + κ).
At the extremes p = 1/2 and p = 1, the strategies OA and FC begin to dominate,
respectively, as the line qc(p) tapers to 1.
2.3 Discussion
In this chapter, we have presented a two-player, two action coordination game in
a fluctuating environment where players independently sense private cues from the
environment and share their cues with each other. In our analysis, we found the
optimal strategies that promote coordination across all levels of sensing and sharing
fidelities (Figures 2.4 and 2.6). When individual sensing is very reliable, there is no
need to share signals because players can accurately infer the environmental state
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independently. When sensing is unreliable, players prefer to ignore their information
altogether and always commit to a single action. The “majority logic” strategy is
optimal when private information has intermediate fidelity and social information has
high fidelity. This strategy highlights the importance of information sharing because
they are the only optimal strategies that utilize the shared social cues. Because these
optimal strategies are derived from a first-principles approach, their appearance in
our model offers insight into the mechanisms that maintain group behaviors.
The Majority Logic strategies strike a balance between when to use information
as a predictor of the environment and when to use information as a means to coor-
dinate. Essentially, it allows players to coordinate when their individual inferences
(private information) about the environment conflict, and to choose the correct action
when they agree. The interplay of private and social information in our model draws
similarities to Condorcet’s jury theorem, where in [52], states that good reliability
of private information is a requirement to effectively make group decisions based on
social information in the large population limit. In their model, individuals disregard
social information when private information is poor. When it is more accurate, indi-
viduals rely more on social information to make a decision. In our model, these two
situations are akin to the fitness maximizing regions of OA and OB for poor sensing
fidelity, and the region where ML thrives, respectively. These results also corroborate
with controlled experimental lab work conducted on nine-spined sticklebacks [108].
When private experience about foraging sites was 100% reliable, sticklebacks based
foraging decisions only on private information. When it was less reliable, they fol-
lowed social cues instead. Without perfect sensing capabilities, organisms need to
rely on social information to survive [108, 52, 83, 5, 64].
In the region of unreliable private information and reliable social information (Fig
2.5, right), there is an abundance of Nash equilibria (ten) that are suboptimal to
the OA and OB strategies. This suggests that in the context of coordination games,
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social cues serve as a coordination device rather than as an additional source of
information about the environment. However, the strategies included in this region,
which includes majority logic and its variants, will often coordinate on the wrong
action. This is because the social cues carry no information about the environment,
as the private cues are themselves uninformative. The best an individual can do
to infer the environment is simply to guess. However, if both guess independently,
they will only coordinate 1/4 of the time. If they play OA, they are guaranteed
to coordinate for the fraction of time the environment spends in state eA. Hence,
committing to a single action corresponding to the most frequent environment (OA
or OB) is the best the group can do when information about the environment is poor.
Therefore in principle, information sharing is useful only when the information that
is being shared is itself reliable.
Our game-theoretic model portrays situations where communicating individuals
must coordinate behaviors in uncertain fluctuating environments. These situations
pervade collective behaviors in groups of organisms across the animal kingdom from
schools of fish to bacterial colonies [?]. The information flow in our model is partic-
ularly inspired by quorum sensing in bacterial populations. Such a communication
system enables bacteria to display complex social behaviors [120]. Therefore, game
theory is a natural framework in which to study microbial decision-making to consol-
idate experimental understanding of the phenomena.
Several questions remain in our study. Our work has not yet considered play-
ers with memory of past signals and actions. Repeated games that endow players
with these reasoning capabilities, for example the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD),
gives rise to new classes of strategies that offer insights into the evolution of coop-
eration [88, 107]. Such an extension of our current formulation would give players,
through an expanded space of memory-dependent strategies, the ability to anticipate
environmental switches and the intentions of others. These considerations warrant
29
future research. Furthermore, better quality signalling entails increasing fitness costs
[15, 16, 104, 61, 47]. Our work has not yet investigated such evolutionary tradeoffs.
Instead, we have presented a systematic, centralized analysis of the optimal strategies
given a fixed, costless communication system. Consequently, we have yet to address
whether the optimal strategies identified are stable in an evolutionary sense, with or
without costly signalling.
Moving forward, evolutionary dynamics can be applied to our formulation in the
context of population games [99]. Population games are a framework to describe
the interactions between a well-mixed, continuous mass of agents that select from the
same set of strategies. In the population, interactions between agents are probabilistic
and pair-wise, which allows two-player normal form games to be represented as pop-
ulation games. Such a framework works well with our aim to describe a population of
organisms that can adopt a variety of communication-based strategies, e.g., quorum
sensing bacteria. Furthermore, due to the potential structure of our games Gp and
Gpq (see Remark 2.3), they admit evolutionary dynamics that have certain stability
guarantees [98, 99]. Embedding our model into population games will be necessary
to identify which local maximizers of average fitness are likely to be reached. In do-
ing so, we hope that our model encourages the integration of social interactions and




For notational convenience in the following Appendices, we abuse notation of strategy
vectors si by assigning the numeric value si(yi) = 0 if action A was assigned, and
si(yi) = 1 if B was assigned (yi is either αi or (αi, βi)). For instance, the strategy
vector s>FC = [A,B] corresponds to the vector s
>
FC = [0, 1] whenever computations
are needed. We will adopt the 0, 1 notation for strategy vectors throughout this
supplementary document.
2.A Calculation of fitness functions fp and fpq
Here we calculate the fitnesses fp(s1, s2) and fpq(s1, s2) explicitly in terms of p, q, and
the strategy vectors s1 and s2.
The fitness fp




πp(α1, α2, E)U(s1(α1), s2(α2), E). (2.7)
It is a sum of eight terms since (α1, α2, E) ∈ {EA, EB}3. We define [QpA]α1,α2 =
P (α1, α2|EA) as the matrix of conditional probabilities on E = EA, and similarly for














where p̄ = 1− p.
The only nonzero terms in (2.7) occur when U(s1(αi), s2(αj), EA) = bA, which
happens if and only if s1(αi) = s2(αj) = 0 (similarly, bB for E = EB). Therefore, the
fitness can be written
fp(s1, s2) = cA(1− s1)>QpA(1− s2) + cBs>1 QpBs2
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where recall that cA = bA
vBA
vBA+vAB
, cB = bB
vAB
vBA+vAB
, and we denote 1 as the vector
[1, 1]>. The expression can alternatively be written in a bilinear form,
fp(s1, s2) = s
>
1 Q
ps2 − cAL>p (s1 + s2) + cA. (2.8)
where
Qp ≡ cAQpA + cBQpB
L>p ≡ [p, p̄].
The fitness fpq




πpq(y1, y2, E)U(s1(y1), s2(y2), E).
The expressions for fpq are derived in the same manner as fp (eq. (2.8)). However,
we need to define the new matrices QA and QB whose entries are the conditional




p2q2 p2qq̄ pp̄qq̄ pp̄q̄2
p2qq̄ p2q̄2 pp̄q2 pp̄qq̄
pp̄qq̄ pp̄q2 p̄2q̄2 p̄2qq̄






p̄2q2 p̄2qq̄ pp̄qq̄ pp̄q̄2
p̄2qq̄ p̄2q̄2 pp̄q2 pp̄qq̄
pp̄qq̄ pp̄q2 p2q̄2 p2qq̄
pp̄q̄2 pp̄qq̄ p2qq̄ p2q2


Then fpq(s1, s2), where s1, s2 are four-vectors of ones and zeros, can be written
fpq(s1, s2) = cA(1− s1)>QpqA (1− s2) + cBs>1 QpqB s2
where 1 = [1, 1, 1, 1]>. An alternative bilinear form is
fpq(s1, s2) = s
>
1 Q
pqs2 − cAL>pq(s1 + s2) + cA.
where
Qpq ≡ cAQpqA + cBQpqB
L>pq ≡ [p(pq + p̄q̄), p(pq̄ + p̄q), p̄(pq + p̄q̄), p̄(pq̄ + p̄q)]
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Figure 2.9: Fitnesses of the ML (Left) and FC (Right) strategy profiles for κ = 1
(fpq(MLA) = fpq(MLB)). In these contours, bA = bB = 1 and vAB = vBA, so cA =
cB = 0.5 and the environments spend equal amounts of time in the long run. Hence,
the fitness values on the z axis portray the fraction of time the players coordinate on
the correct action. The fitnesses are fpq(ML) = (1 − 2pp̄)(q2 + 1) + 2p̄(2p − 1)q and
fpq(FC) = p
2.
The fitness of FC is
fpq(FC) = (cA + cB)p
2
The fitnesses of MLA and MLB are
fpq(MLA) = fpq(sMLA , sMLA) = (cAp̄
2 + cBp
2)q2 + 2cAp̄(2p− 1)q + cA(1− 2pp̄)
fpq(MLB) = fpq(sMLB , sMLB) = (cAp
2 + cB p̄
2)q2 + 2cB p̄(2p− 1)q + cB(1− 2pp̄).
(2.9)
They increase quadratically in q. Figure 2.9 plots the fitness surfaces of FC and ML.
2.B Proof of Proposition 2.1
We reproduce the statement from Section 2.2.1.
For p ∈ [1/2, 1], all Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers of Gp are necessarily
symmetric strategy profiles, i.e. s∗1 = s
∗
2.
Proof. This fact is proven by exhaustion. For each of the six asymmetric strategy
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profiles, we show there is at least one player that can imitate the other’s strategy
to gain fitness. This implies Nash equilibria and fitness maximizers are necessarily
symmetric strategy profiles. The fitnesses of these six profiles are given by the entries
below (or above) the diagonal of the payoff matrix (2.4), reproduced here.





sOA cA cAp cAp̄ 0
sFC cAp (cA + cB)p
2 (cA + cB)pp̄ cBp
sFC cAp̄ (cA + cB)pp̄ (cA + cB)p̄
2 cB p̄
sOB 0 cBp cB p̄ cB
1. fp(sOA, sFC) = cAp. If the sFC player switches to sOA, the fitness becomes
fp(sOA, sOA) = cA > cAp iff p 6= 1. If the sOA player switches to sFC, the fitness
becomes fp(sFC, sFC) = (cA+cB)p
2 > cAp iff p > cA/(cA+cB), which is satisfied
at p = 1.
2. fp(sOA, sFC) = cAp̄. If the sFC player switches to sOA, the fitness becomes
fp(sOA, sOA) = cA > cB p̄.
3. fp(sOA, sOB) = 0. If the sOB player switches to sOA, the fitness becomes
fp(sOA, sOA) = cA > 0.
4. fp(sFC, sFC) = (cA+cB)pp̄. If the sFC player switches to sFC, the fitness becomes
fp(sFC, sFC) = (cA + cB)p
2 > (cA + cB)pp̄.
5. fp(sFC, sOB) = cBp. If the sFC player switches to sOB, the fitness becomes
fp(sOB, sOB) = cB > cBp if and only if p 6= 1. If the sOB player switches to
sFC, the fitness becomes fp(sFC, sFC) = (cA + cB)p
2 > cBp iff p > cB/(cA + cB),
which is satisfied at p = 1.
6. fp(sFC, sOB) = cB p̄. If the sFC player switches to sOB, the fitness becomes
fp(sOB, sOB) = cB > cB p̄.
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2.C Nash equilibrium conditions
The game Gp Due to the statement in Appendix 2.B, we only need to consider the
four symmetric strategy profiles to find the Nash equilibria of the game Gp. We give
an expression to check whether a symmetric strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1. The strategy profile (s∗, s∗) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium in Gp if
diag(2s∗ − 1)(Qps∗ − cALp)  0
where 1 = [1, 1]> and  denotes element-wise strict inequality.
Proof. We define player i’s best response s∗i to player j’s strategy sj as
s∗i = BRi(sj) ≡ arg max
si
fp(si, sj)





0 if [Qpsj − cALp]Ek < 0
1 if [Qpsj − cALp]Ek ≥ 0
, k = A,B
When the condition above is met with equality, player i is indifferent to choosing 0
or 1 at s∗i (Ek). For convention, we define the best-response to choose 1 in this case.
The definition of a Nash equilibrium (s1, s2) states
s1 ∈ BR1(s2) and s2 ∈ BR2(s1)
Since we can consider only symmetric strategy profiles, the condition simplifies to
s ∈ BR(s) 
The Nash equilibrium regions for each of the four strategy profiles are derived
by applying Theorem 2.1, which gives two inequality conditions in terms of p and κ
(after normalizing by dividing cB). The fitness maximizer regions are determined by
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comparing fitnesses for each strategy. For instance, the region where OA maximizes
fitness is derived by setting fp(OA) > fp(X) for each X = FC, FC, and OB. Table 3
lists the properties of all symmetric strategy profiles in Gp.
Table 3: Properties for the symmetric strategy profiles of Gp.
Profile (s, s) vector form fp(s, s) NE region (p, κ) fitness max region
OA [0, 0]> cA everywhere κ > {p2/(1− p2), 1}
FC [0, 1]> (cA + cB)p2 κ > p̄/p, κ < p/p̄ κ < p2/(1− p2), κ > 1/p2 − 1
FC [1, 0]> (cA + cB)p̄2 nowhere nowhere
OB [1, 1]> cB everywhere κ < {1/p2 − 1, 1}
The game with information sharing Gpq
The Nash equilibrium condition for the game Gpq is stated here.
Theorem 2.2. The strategy profile (s∗1, s
∗
2) is a (strict) Nash equilibrium in Gpq if
diag(2s∗1 − 1)(Qpqs∗2 − cALpq)  0
diag(2s∗2 − 1)(Qpqs∗1 − cALpq)  0
Proof. Similar arguments as in Theorem 2.1. 








, if κ > 1
q < p, if κ = 1
The region is shown in Figure 2.10.
Proof. Recall sFC = [0, 0, 1, 1]
>. From Theorem 2.2, the NE condition for (sFC, sFC)
is
diag(2sFC − 1)(QpqsFC − cALpq)  0
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After dividing by cB and p, we obtain four inequality conditions
−κpq + p̄q̄ < 0
−κpq̄ + p̄q < 0
−κp̄q + pq̄ > 0
−κp̄q̄ + pq > 0
(2.10)
If κ = 1, the first and fourth inequality conditions above are the same, and the second
and third are the same. This reduces (2.10) to two conditions - 1) pq > p̄q̄ and 2)


















If κ < 1, it is p̄
p̄+pκ
< q < κp
p̄+pκ
. If κ > 1, it is κp̄
p+p̄κ
< q <, p
p+p̄κ

Corollary 2.2. In Gpq, MLA is a Nash equilibrium for
p((1 + κ)qq̄ − κ) + (q̄ − κq) < 0
p(κ(2q − 1)− (κ+ 1)qq̄) + (1− (1 + κ)q) < 0
κp̄(p̄qq̄ − pq − p̄q̄) + p2qq̄ < 0
κp̄(p̄q2 − pq − p̄q̄) + p2q2 > 0
The region is shown in Figure 2.11.
Proof. Apply Theorem 2.2 
The Nash Equilibrium region can be derived in a similar manner for MLB, which
coincides with MLA when κ = 1.
Corollary 2.3. In Gpq, the asymmetric strategy profile (s1, s2) with s1 = sFC =








, if κ > 1
q > p, if κ = 1
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Figure 2.10: Nash equilibrium region for the Follow Cue (FC) strategy profile in the
parameter space (p, q) ∈ [1
2
, 1]2, as given by Corollary 2.1.
The s2 strategy “follows” the social cue sent by player 1. Hence we refer to this
strategy profile as “FC-F” (Follow Cue - Follower). The region is shown in Figure
2.12.
Proof. Apply Theorem 2.2 . 
2.D Parameterizations of critical sharing theshold
We derive the parameterizations for the critical threshold value qc(p) in the six cases
that determine the fitness maximizer in Gpq. These curves are the boundaries of the
region where the ML strategies are fitness maximizers (see Figure 2.13).





































, κ < 1.
38
Figure 2.11: Nash equilibrium region for the Majority Logic (ML) strategy profiles
in the parameter space (p, q) ∈ [1
2
, 1]2, as given by Corollary 2.2.
Figure 2.12: Nash equilibrium region for the FC-F strategy profile in the parameter
space (p, q) ∈ [1
2
, 1]2, as given by Corollary 2.3.
39
Figure 2.13: Boundary curves labeled (a-f) that define the critical threshold fidelity
qc that separates fitness maximizing regions. The labeled curves are parameterized
according to Proposition 2.2, which separate the region where the Majority Logic































≤ p ≤ 1, κ = 1.
Proof. Depending on which of the six cases in the main text is given, fpq(MLA) or
fpq(MLB) is equated to the fitness of OA, OB, or FC to derive the expression for qc.
Since qc must be between 1/2 and 1, there is a lower cutoff for p in cases (a-d) below




Mathematical models of epidemic spreading over networks characterize how the spa-
tial features of the network structure affects the dynamics of epidemic spread [115,
36, 30, 69, 109, 2, 112]. A simple, yet descriptive formulation for such processes is the
susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model, where an individual is either infected or
susceptible to infection. A celebrated result in such models identifies a threshold on
the infection parameters that determines whether the epidemic eradicates quickly or
persists for a long time. Specifically, δ/β > λmax(A) (β is the disease transmission
rate, δ the healing rate, and λmax(A) the largest eigenvalue of the network adjacency
matrix) is a sufficient condition for the disease to eradicate exponentially fast. The
opposite strict inequality is a necessary condition for the disease to persist for a long
period of time. The steady state in this regime is often referred to as the endemic or
metastable state.
These classical models, however, do not account for human behavioral responses
to the epidemic. The nodes in the network interact with their neighbors without
restraint, even when the epidemic is highly prevalent. With the widespread avail-
ability of social media and news outlets on multiple platforms, individuals may be
well-informed about the current state of ongoing epidemics and how to take precau-
tionary measures to avoid getting sick. In the 2009 H1N1 Influenza pandemic, people
responded to public service announcements by increasing the frequency of washing
hands, staying at home when they or loved ones were sick, or avoiding large pub-
lic gatherings [105]. In the recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa, a combination
of quarantining and sanitary burial methods were shown to significantly reduce the
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rate of virus spread [80]. These precautions and social distancing actions effectively
limit epidemic spread. Individuals’ distancing actions depend on the extent of how
informed they are. The dissemination and exchange of information influences the
public’s behavior, affecting the course of the epidemic itself, in turn affecting the
public’s behavior again [14, 31, 45]. This feedback loop allows epidemic spreading to
coevolve with human social behavior, inducing complex dynamics [116].
Recent research effort has focused on modeling human behavioral elements into
existing models of epidemic spreading. A review of the recent literature can be found
in [116]. Such models present general challenges for characterizing decentralized and
dynamic protection measures and also capture a realistic aspect of disease spread
in society. When individuals take social distancing actions based on the level of
information they have, they reduce contact with others and the epidemic prevalence
reduces significantly [34, 92, 85]. They can become aware of the epidemic by receiving
information from their social contacts or from a global broadcast [37, 38, 103]. In
certain formulations, awareness raises the epidemic threshold below which the disease
dies out fast [102, 101, 97]. Other actions include switching one’s contact links, giving
rise to a coevolving network [70]. Endowing individuals with local prevalence-based
awareness highlights the role of network effects [123],[122].
In this chapter, we first present SIS epidemic dynamics in its most basic form -
as an ordinary differential equation describing a well-mixed population of infected
and susceptible individuals (Section 3.1). The simplificity of the ODE formulation
guides our intuition in a benchmark networked model of SIS dynamics, presented in
Section 3.2 as a discrete-time Markov chain. Networked models of epidemic spreading
more realistically captures the nuances of local spread, which is determined by the
graph structure of the network. We then present our networked SIS process with
dynamically distributed information and social distancing actions (Section 3.3). The
information the agents receive comes from their social contacts and a global broadcast
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about the current state of the epidemic. An agent’s social distancing action reduces its
contact network interactions, the magnitude of which depends on how informed it is.
Using a mean-field approximation on infection probabilities, we prove that awareness
reduces the endemic equilibrium level, but cannot improve upon the epidemic thresh-
old for persistence (Section 3.4). In addition, we provide a stochastic comparison
analysis between the awareness and benchmark processes using a monotone coupling
technique (Section 3.5). This establishes the fact that adding awareness improves
upon any epidemic performance metric in expectation compared to the benchmark
model, e.g. time to eradication and the cumulative infected nodes over time. Through
this analysis, we provide a closed-form expression for the difference in performance.
Through extensive simulations on three families of random graphs (Erdős-Renyi, ge-
ometric, and scale-free), we find that local contact information most effectively limits
epidemic spread (Section 3.6).
3.1 ODE models of SIS epidemics












− δI Infected population
(3.1)
where β > 0 is the infection rate of the disease, δ > 0 is the healing rate, and
N > 0 is the size of the population. The SIS model is one among many types
of ”compartmental” epidemic models, where each individual in the population is
in a particular state, or compartment. Compartmental epidemic ODE equations
of this type were first extensively studied by Kermack and McKendrick [51], where
they studied the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) compartmental model. One can
interpret (3.1) as having a continuum of agents of mass N , where the population is





Figure 3.1: SIS dynamics state transition diagram
other individual in the population equally. Here, we assume that S(0) + I(0) = N
with 0 ≤ S(0), I(0) ≤ N . The fact that d
dt
(S + I) = 0 ensures S(t) + I(t) = N
with S(t), I(t) ≥ 0 ∀t, so the total population is kept constant and the dynamics
can be described by just one state variable. The infected population heals to become
susceptible at a rate proportional to its level. The susceptible population becomes
infected by interacting with the infected population (see Figure 3.1). In phase space,
the point (S∗, I∗) = (N, 0) (all-susceptible state) is always an equilibrium point - it
















Stability analysis shows it is stable if R0 ≡ β/δ < 1. Here, R0 is known as
the basic reproductive number in epidemiology, and quantifies the expected number
of secondary infections from a single infected individual. Hence, I(t) → 0. It is
unstable if R0 > 1. When (S
∗, I∗) is unstable, there exists another equilibrium point




)) which is stable. This equilibrium is known in epidemiology
as the endemic state, where a fraction of the population is always infected. In this
scenario, the disease is infectious enough to sustain itself within the population.
We already see that a simple mathematical model of epidemic spreading gives rise
to a rich set of dynamics. Using standard techniques, the system (3.1) can be solved
analytically.
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(a) I(t) when β > δ. Here,
β = 0.5, δ = 0.3, N = 100, I(0) = 2.

















(b) I(t) when β < δ. Here,
β = 0.5, δ = 0.7, N = 100, I(0) = 98.
Figure 3.2: Solution to SIS epidemic ODE. Left: the endemic equilibrium is asymptot-
ically stable, so the disease persists. Right: the all-susceptible state is asymptotically
stable, and the disease is eradicated.
3.1.1 Exact solution to the SIS ODE
One can derive the closed-form solution to (3.1). Since S(t) = N − I(t), it amounts




























Integrating from 0 to t with respect to the time variable, we get











Solving for I(t), we obtain
I(t) = Î × I(0)e
(β−δ)t
I(0) (e(β−δ)t − 1) + Î
(3.2)
where we recall that Î = N(1− δ
β
).
The solution (3.2) is consistent with the stability analysis of the previous section
(see Figure 3.2). When β < δ, the numerator vanishes for large t, so I(t)→ 0. When
β > δ, the exponential terms in the numerator and denominator dominate. Thus,
I(t)→ N(1− δ/β) = Î. This holds for 0 < I(0) ≤ N .
3.2 A benchmark networked SIS model
Network models of epidemic spreading are more realistic than their well-mixed ODE
counterparts, as they explicitly describe local transmission of disease. Here, a stan-
dard model of epidemic spreading over a finite static network of n agents is introduced
(studied in [115],[3], and Section 5 of [2]), which we will refer to as the benchmark
model.
Consider the set of nodes N = {1, . . . , n} interconnected by a set of edges E .
Epidemic spread occurs in discrete time steps t = 0, 1, . . . over the undirected graph
GC = (N , E), whose n×n adjacency matrix is defined for any i, j ∈ N , as [AC ]ij = 1 if
(i, j) ∈ E and 0 otherwise. The graph GC will be refered to as the contact network. An
agent i ∈ N is either susceptible to the disease or infected by it. The epidemic states
are defined as Ω = {0, 1}n. For any s ∈ Ω and i ∈ N , either si = 0, meaning agent i
is susceptible, or si = 1, meaning it is infected. Susceptible agents can contract the
disease from neighboring agents in the contact network. When agent i is susceptible
in the epidemic state is s ∈ Ω (si = 0), its probability of getting infected in the
next time step due to an interaction with its neighbor j ∈ NCi is given by βsj where
β ∈ (0, 1) is the transmission probability of the disease. Hence, an individual can
only contract the disease from an infected neighbor. Agent i interacts with each of
its neighbors independently. Therefore, i’s probability of not becoming infected in
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Figure 3.3: SIS dynamics state transition diagram





Consequently, its probability of getting infected is




When agent i is infected in state s ∈ Ω (si = 1), it becomes susceptible in the next
time step with probability δpi00(s), where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the healing probability of the
disease. Thus, for an infected node to become susceptible, it must heal and not get
re-infected by its neighbors. Node i’s transition probabilities are illustrated in Figure
3.3 and summarized by Pi : Ω× {0, 1} → [0, 1] defined by
Pi(s, 0) = (1− si)pi00(s) + siδpi00(s)
Pi(s, 1) = (1− si)pi01(s) + si(1− δpi00(s))
(3.4)
For each i ∈ N and s ∈ Ω, the Pi define the benchmark SIS Markov chain over Ω by




Pi(s, s′i), ∀s, s′ ∈ Ω
This chain has one absorbing state, the all-susceptible state o , {0}n. The probability




with initial distribution π0 ∈ ∆(Ω). Because there is one absorbing state (all sus-
ceptible), the stationary distribution is π(o) = 1 which satisfies π = πK. The exact












3.2.1 Mean-field approximation of the benchmark model
A mean-field approximation of this Markov chain is extensively studied in [1]. They
consider the discrete-time deterministic dynamical system
xt+1i = ψi(x)







 , i ∈ N
(3.6)
Here, the state xti ∈ [0, 1] approximates the true probability pti (eqn. (3.5)) that node
i is infected at time t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. The advantage of using an MFA over analyzing
the true infection probabilities is that we get a recursive update rule to determine the
evolution of the approximations. The form of (3.6) comes from writing the expected
value of the infection state st+1i conditional on the previous state vector s
t. We
represent the discrete-time mapping (RHS of (3.6)) with ψ : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
E[st+1i |st] = Pi(sti, 1) = sti(1− δpi00(st)) + (1− sti)pi01(st)
= sti(1− δ) + (1− (1− δ)sti)pi01(st)








Note that the above equation still depends on the true infection state sti, and is not
yet a mean-field approximation. The MFA (3.6) results by replacing the state st with
xt, thus defining a recursive update rule.
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Remark 3.1. A relation between the approximated probability of infection, xti, and
the true probability of infection, pti, has yet to be established in the literature. The






, which contains multiple
cross terms of alternating sign in si and sj, j ∈ NCi . A mean-field approximation on
pti that does have an upper-bound guarantee follows the dynamics
xt+1i = (1− δ)xti + (1− (1− δ)xti)
∑
j∈NCi
xtj, i ∈ N . (3.7)











. The equation (3.7) still acts as a
meaningful epidemic dynamic because the mapping is increasing in the xtj variables
(infected neighbors increase my chance of getting infected).
The fact that xti in (3.7) upper bounds p
t
i is proven by assuming independence of
infection events (see Ch. 4 of [72]):
Pr(stj = 1, s
t
i = 1) = Pr(s
t
j = 1|sti = 1)Pr(sti = 1)




3.2.2 Equilibrium properties of the benchmark SIS model
Here, we summarize a notable result on equilibrium properties of the benchmark
MFAs (3.6) and (3.7) from [1]. All proofs in this subsection can be found in that
reference, and assume connectedness of the contact network.
Theorem 3.1. If λmax(βAC + (1 − δ)I) < 1, the origin is globally asymptotically
stable in the benchmark MFA.
Here, λmax(A) is the largest eigenvalue magnitude of a matrix A, AC is the ad-
jacency matrix of the contact network, and I is the n × n identity matrix. We can
think of λmax(βAC + (1 − δ)I) as a networked version of R0, the basic reproductive
number.
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Theorem 3.2 (Theorem 3.2 and 5.1 in [1]). If λmax(βAC+(1−δ)I) > 1, the discrete-
time dynamical systems (3.6) and (3.7) each admit a unique equilibrium point q∗ ∈
(0, 1)n (non-zero ∀i). This equilibrium is asymptotically stable under the MFA (3.6).
Hence, just like in the ODE SIS model, there are two regimes of operation de-
termined by an epidemic threshold - one in which the all-healthy state prevails, and
one in which an endemic state prevails. The endemic state q∗ is also referred to as a
non-trivial fixed point.
3.3 The networked SIS model with awareness
We modify the benchmark Markov chain model of Section 3.2 to take into account the
agent awareness of the current epidemic state. The information agent i receives comes
from two sources: the proportion of infected neighbors in its local social network and
a global broadcast of the proportion of infected nodes in the entire network. The
social network is a graph GI = (N , EI) with the same nodes as GC but with different
edges, representing the nodes’ social communication links. The set of i’s neighbors in











sj ,∀s ∈ Ω (3.8)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that governs the trust nodes place in information from
their social contacts. Consequently, node i reduces its interactions with its physical
neighbors through the social distancing action
ai(s) ≡ 1− µi(s),

























s(t) → s(t+ 1)
Awareness
Distancing actions
Figure 3.4: System-level diagram
We similarly define pi00,d(s) ≡ 1−pi01,d(s). An infected agent’s probability of recovering
becomes δpi00,d(s). Note for all s ∈ Ω, pi01,d(s) ≤ pi01(s). Combined with the social
distancing behaviors ai, the local awareness spread dynamics in (3.8) make the effect
of user behavior on its infection probability endogenous to the benchmark chain model
through a negative feedback loop. We define the Pdi analogously to (3.4),
Pdi (s, 0) = (1− si)pi00,d(s) + siδpi00,d(s)
Pdi (s, 1) = (1− si)pi01,d(s) + si(1− δpi00,d(s)).






Pdi (s, s′i), ∀s, s′ ∈ Ω
whose unique absorbing state is also o = {0}n, the all-susceptible state. The feedback
loop between the epidemic state and agent awareness is illustrated in Figure 3.4.
The awareness model captures the different ways an agent may receive information
about an ongoing epidemic from the media. Large media corporations and public
health institutions such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
and the World Health Organization (WHO) often report an estimated total number
of people infected nationwide or globally at a given time, and this information is
disseminated amongst the population. Information is also exchanged through one’s
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Sample paths - Erdos-Renyi
no awareness
with awareness
Figure 3.5: A pair of sample paths generated from the Markov chain models. Here,
β = 0.1, δ = 0.5, α = 1, and GI = GC . Performed on a 100 node Erdős-Renyi network
with parameter p = 0.1.
personalized social links, which can range beyond a person’s geographic location.
It is important to note that since the all-susceptible state is the unique absorbing
state for both benchmark and awareness chains. Since it is accessible from all other
states, the chains must eventually absorb in finite time with probability one. This
reveals the long-run equilibrium properties, but says nothing about what happens in
the medium-run, before the disease dies out. The expected absorption time grows
exponentially with the size of the network. Thus, one must wait an unrealistically
long time for an epidemic to die out on its own.
3.4 The endemic state with awareness
In this section, we prove that an analogous MFA of the awareness epidemic model
admits a non-trivial fixed point in the same regime of epidemic persistence of the
benchmark model, λmax(βAC + (1 − δ)I) > 1. Therefore, the awareness and social
distancing mechanism cannot eradicate an epidemic. We prove existence of such an
equilibrium, and it remains to prove that there is a unique non-trivial fixed point.
Numerical simulations suggest the existence of a unique and asymptotically stable
non-trivial fixed point in this regime.
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Figure 3.6: Comparison between the true expected number of infecteds, the approx-
imated number of infecteds (MFA), and the exact Markovian dynamics. The MFA
dynamics are calculated by computing the recursion xt+1i = φi(x) and summing over
all nodes i. The true expected number of infecteds is calculated by iterating the
probability distribution of states via πt+1 = πtKd, and summing over all states that
give infected nodes. The MFA dynamics appear to overestimate the true expected
number after a short amount of time. In this simulation, β = 0.2, δ = 0.1, the contact
network (as well as the information network) is the complete graph over n = 8 nodes,
and λmax = 7. The initial probability distribution of states π
0 ∈ ∆(Ω) as well as the
initial state for the MFA and Markov chain is selected where three nodes are infected.
3.4.1 Mean-field approximation of the awareness model
In the same fashion in which (3.6) approximates the true probabilities of infection
over time, we study a corresponding MFA of our awareness Markov chain. These
dynamics will follow the update equation
xt+1i = φi(x)









where again the state vector xt is an approximation of the true infection probabilities
pt (3.5). Sample path trajectories of benchmark and awareness MFAs are shown in
Figure 3.5. We have yet to establish an analytical relation between these quantities,
see Remark 3.1 in Section 3.2.1. However, numerical simulations (Figure 3.6) suggest
the MFA (3.9) is a slight overestimate of the true infection probabilities. Here, we
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denote the awareness MFA mapping (RHS above) as φ : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n.
We note a few properties about the MFAs mapping ψ(x) (benchmark, eqn (3.6))
and φ(x) (awareness, eqn (3.9)). They are both nonlinear, continuous mappings
satisfying φ(x) ≺ ψ(x) for x ∈ [0, 1]n\0n, φ(0n) = ψ(0n) = 0n. Linearization of ψ and
φ about the origin yields the same Jacobian matrix, βAC+(1−δ)I, and hence the same
linearized dynamics xt+1 = (βAC+(1−δ)I)xt. The linear dynamics serve as an upper
bound to both (3.6) and (3.9). Therefore, if λmax(βAC + (1− δ)I) < 1, the origin is a
globally stable fixed point and it is an unstable fixed point if λmax(βAC+(1−δ)I) > 1.
3.4.2 Proof of existence of an endemic equilibrium
We now prove that the condition λmax(βAC + (1 − δ)I) > 1 is sufficient for there to
exist a non-trivial fixed point in the awareness MFA.
Theorem 3.1. If λmax(βAC + (1− δ)In) > 1, there exists a nontrivial fixed point p∗
for φ. That is, φ(p∗) = p∗ with p∗ ∈ (0, 1)n.
To re-iterate, the existence of such a fixed point suggests the epidemic has a
metastable endemic state, where the spread of the disease is fast enough to sustain
an epidemic in the network. Our condition coincides with the condition for existence,
uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of the non-trivial fixed point q∗ of ψ,
which is λmax(βAC + (1− δ)I) > 1, i.e. when the origin in the linearized dynamics is
unstable (Theorem 5.1, [2]). This condition incorporates the factors that contribute
to the rate of spreading - δ, β, and the contact network AC . The proof of Theorem
3.1 makes use of the following three lemmas.
Lemma 3.1 (Lemma 3.1, [2]). There exists a vector ν  0n such that (βAC−δIn)ν 
0n if and only if λmax(βAC + (1− δ)In) > 1.
The connectedness assumption for GC is necessary for the above Lemma because
the proof applies the Perron-Frobenius theorem for nonnegative irreducible matrices.
The next result is an equivalent formulation of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem.
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Lemma 3.2. (Theorem 4.2.3, [48]): Suppose fi : Dn → R, i = 1, . . . , n are continu-
ous mappings, where
Dn = {x ∈ Rn : xi ∈ [`i, ui], ∀i}
for real numbers `i, ui. We also define the set
D−i = {x−i ∈ Rn−1 : xj ∈ [`j, uj] ∀j 6= i}
If for every i and for all x−i ∈ D−i,
fi(x1, . . . , `i, . . . , xn) = fi(x−i, `i) ≥ 0 (3.10)
fi(x1, . . . , ui, . . . , xn) = fi(x−i, ui) ≤ 0, (3.11)
then there exists a point x∗ ∈ Dn such that fi(x∗) = 0, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The final lemma needed is a technical result for the mean-field mappings φi.
Lemma 3.3. For each i ∈ N , define the maps fi : [0, 1]n → R
fi(x) , φi(x)− xi
= −δxi + (1− (1− δ)xi)pi01,d(x)
Then for any i ∈ N and x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, the function fi(x−i, ·) has a unique root
c∗i (x−i) ∈ [0, 1) which depends continuously on x−i. Furthermore, one can find a
sequence xk−i → 0n−1 s.t. c∗i (xk−i) is monotonically decreasing to 0.
Proof. For any i ∈ N and x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1,
fi(x−i, 0) = p
i
01,d(x−i, 0) ≥ 0.
and
fi(x−i, 1) = δ(p
i
01,d(x−i, 1)− 1) < 0.
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The function fi(x−i, ·) is strictly decreasing: for a, b ∈ [0, 1] s.t. a < b, fi(x−i, a) −
fi(x−i, b) is given by
(b− a)(δ + (1− δ)pi01,d(x−i, b)) + · · ·
+ (1− a(1− δ))(pi01,d(x−i, a)− pi01,d(x−i, b))
> 0.
This follows because pi01,d(x−i, xi) is decreasing in xi (xi contributes to global aware-
ness). Hence for every x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, there is a unique c∗i (x−i) ∈ [0, 1) s.t. fi(x−i, c∗i (x−i)) =
0, and c∗i (x−i) depends continuously on x−i. To see this, observe that c
∗
i (x−i) ∈ [0, 1)








− δxi = 0,
which is a polynomial in xi. The coefficients of the polynomial depend continuously
on x−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1, and the roots of any polynomial are continuous with respect to its
coefficients. Consequently, for any sequence xk−i → 0n−1, c∗i (xk−i) → c∗i (0n−1) = 0 by
continuity. This allows us to select a subsequence of xk−i such that c
∗
i is monotonically
decreasing along the subsequence. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of this section.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: See Figure 3.7 for an illustration of the proof. Let the map-
pings fi, i ∈ N be as in Lemma 3.3. We need to verify (3.10) and (3.11) hold for
all i and for choices of `i, ui satisfying 0 < `i < ui. This will ensure the awareness






c∗i (x−i) < u < 1.
Then for all x−i ∈ [0, u]n−1,
















Figure 3.7: Diagram of the proof of Theorem 3.1. Here, p∗ denotes a nontrivial fixed
point of the awareness MFA mapping φ.
since u > c∗i (x−i). Thus, (3.11) holds, regardless of the choice of `i. It remains to find
the `i > 0 s.t. (3.10) is satisfied. Let f(x) , [f1(x), . . . , fn(x)]T and define the sets




The Jacobian of f about the origin is (βAC − δIn). By Lemma 3.1, there exists a
vector ν  0n such that (βAC−δIn)ν  0n. Consequently for sufficiently small ε > 0,
f(εν)  0n,
or εν ∈ φ+. We also define the set
Ri(x−i) , {y ∈ Rn : yi ∈ [0, c∗i (x−i)], yj ∈ [xj, u], j 6= i}
If ενi ≤ c∗i (εν−i) and Ri(εν) ⊂ φ+i , then (3.10) is satisfied, i.e. fi(x−i, ενi) ≥ 0 on
D−i = {εν−i  x−i  u1n−1} for ε sufficiently small. We already have ενi ≤ c∗i (εν−i)
because εν ∈ φ+ ⊂ φ+i . To show Ri(εν) ⊂ φ+i , by Lemma 3.3 we can find a sequence
εkν ∈ φ+ with εk → 0 s.t. c∗i (εkν−i) is monotonically decreasing to 0. By stopping at
a large enough k, we can take a ε small enough such that




Consequently, Ri(εν) ⊂ φ+i . Choosing ε small enough to satisfy (3.13) for all i ∈ N
verifies (3.10) by using Dn = {x ∈ Rn : xj ∈ [ενj, u]}. By Lemma 2, φ has a fixed
point contained in Dn. 
The condition of Theorem 3.1 is independent of the awareness parameter α and
the structure of the information network GI . Hence, social distancing alone cannot
restore stability of the disease-free equilibrium point in the mean-field setting. This
result is in contrast to conclusions made in different SIS model formulations [122, 102],
where the epidemic threshold for stability of the disease-free state improves due to
awareness. However, social distancing in our model lowers the overall metastable
state of an epidemic.
Corollary 3.1. If q∗  0n is the unique nontrivial fixed point of ψ, then a nontrivial
fixed point p∗ of φ satisfies p∗ ≺ q∗ whenever α ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Define the sets ψ+i and ψ
+ similarly as in (3.12) for the benchmark MFA. It
was shown in [2] that q∗ is the unique maximal element of ψ+, i.e q∗  q, ∀q ∈ ψ+,
q 6= q∗. Observe φ(x) ≺ ψ(x) for any x ∈ [0, 1]n\0n. Let x ∈ φ+, x 6= 0n. Then
x  φ(x) ≺ ψ(x), so x ∈ ψ+. Therefore, φ+ ⊂ ψ+, and since p∗ ∈ φ+ for any
nontrivial fixed point of φ, p∗ ≺ q∗. 
The mean-field analysis of this section reveals the qualitative dynamics not ad-
dressed by an absorbing Markov chain analysis. Since the all-susceptible state is the
unique absorbing state and accessible from every other state, the disease eradicates in
finite time with probability one. This answers what happens in the long-run, whereas
the MFA analysis answers what happens before this eventuality. The MFA analysis
concurs with what is observed in simulations of the Markov chain dynamics - fast con-
vergence to an endemic “metastable” state that persists for a very long time before
eradication.
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It remains to prove uniqueness and stability of the non-trivial fixed point guaran-
teed by Theorem 3.1. However, numerical simulations suggest stability of a unique
nontrivial fixed point p∗ of φ. A characterization of these fixed points for different
random graph families is given in Section 3.6.
3.5 Stochastic comparison between benchmark and aware-
ness models
This section presents a stochastic comparison analysis between the benchmark and
awareness Markov chain models via a monotone coupling technique. This analysis
shows that awareness reduces the expectation of any epidemic cost metric (e.g. time
to extinction, total infected over time, etc) and the reduction can be given as a closed-
form expression. First, relevant definitions and examples on monotone couplings are
given. For a full reference on monotone coupling, see Ch 4 of [56].
3.5.1 Monotone couplings
Consider a general countable space X. A partially ordered set (X,X) is the set X
together with a relation X among its elements which satisfies for all x, y, and z ∈ X,
• x X x
• If x X y and y X z, then x X z
• If x X y and y X x, then x = y.
Definition 3.1. Let p1, p2 be probability measures on a measurable space (X,F) and
suppose (X,X) is a partially ordered set. A monotone coupling of p1, p2 is a proba-
bility measure p on (X2,F2) such that for all x′, y′ ∈ X,
∑
xXy′




p(x′, y) = p1(x
′). (3.14)
Thus, for any x, y ∈ X s.t x 6X y, p(x, y) = 0. A monotone coupling p can be
thought of as a joint distribution on two possibly independent random variables whose
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distributions are given by p1, p2, where one of them “dominates” the other in terms
of a partial ordering.
Example 3.1. Consider two biased coins A and B where the biases qA, qB < 1 for
landing heads satisfy qA < qB. The independent distributions are given by pX(0) =
1 − qX , pX(1) = qX for X ∈ {A,B}. The coupling is a joint distribution assigned
to the pair of coin flips to ensure the qA coin can never land heads with the qB coin
landing tails, while the marginal coin flip probabilities remain the same. Also, define
pAB : {0, 1}2 → [0, 1] by 


pAB(0, 0) = 1− qB
pAB(0, 1) = qB − qA
pAB(1, 0) = 0
pAB(1, 1) = qA
(3.15)
Checking (3.14), the marginals are such that
∑
b≥1 pAB(1, b) = qA,
∑
a≤1 pAB(a, 1) =
qB and
∑
b≥0 pAB(0, b) = 1− qA,
∑
a≤0 pAB(a, 0) = 1− qB . Thus, pAB is a monotone
coupling of pA, pB.
A function Z : X → R is increasing in X if whenever x X y, Z(x) ≤ Z(y). The
next result characterizes the difference in expectations of increasing random variables
between the marginals of a monotone coupling.
Proposition 3.1. Keeping the notation of Definition 3.1, suppose p is a monotone




p(Zcτ , Zτ ) (3.16)
where Zτ = {x : Z(x) > τ}.
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Proof. Consider the following quantities:











p(x, y) = p1(Zτ ) (3.17)
p(X,Zτ ) = p2(Zτ )
The second sum over {y ∈ Zτ} can be replaced with {y X x} in (3.17) because 1)
for any x ∈ Zτ , we have {y : y X x} ⊂ Zτ ; and 2) since p is a monotone coupling,
for any y ∈ Zτ s.t. y 6X x, p(x, y) = 0. The last equality of (3.17) follows from
(3.14). Since (X,Zτ ) ⊃ (Zτ , Zτ ) we can write
p2(Zτ )− p1(Zτ ) = p(X,Zτ )− p(Zτ , Zτ )
= p((X,Zτ )\(Zτ , Zτ ))
= p(Zcτ , Zτ )
Equation (3.16) immediately follows. 
Example 3.2. Consider the biased coins of Example 3.1. This example can be ex-
tended to sequences of m ≥ 2 flips, {0, 1}m with the partial order x  y if xi ≤ yi,









Then pAB is a monotone coupling of pA, pB. For x ∈ {0, 1}m, let Z(x) =
∑m
i=1 xi be
the random variable of the number of heads for any given toss sequence. Then Z is






τ , Zτ ).
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Of course, one could trivially compute the LHS above as m(qB − qA) since the distri-
bution of Z is Bernoulli. However, Proposition 3.1 generalizes the difference for any
increasing Z+-valued random variable over a partially ordered set.
The notion of stochastic domination is a natural concept that arises in monotone
couplings.
Definition 3.2. An upper set I is a non-empty subset of (X,X) that satisfies the
following property: if x ∈ I and y X x, then y ∈ I. Let p1, p2 be two probability
measures on (X,F). Then p2 stochastically dominates p1, written as p2  p1, if for
any upper set I ⊂ X, p1(I) ≤ p2(I).
The comparison between benchmark and distancing chains falls into the frame-
work of the above analysis.
3.5.2 Comparison over sample paths
Our main result provides a construction of a monotone coupling between the bench-
mark and distancing probability distributions on sample paths.
Definition 3.3. A sample path is a sequence g = {gt}t∈Z+ such that gt ∈ Ω and
K(gt, gt+1) > 0 for all t ≥ 0, and there is a T < ∞ such that gT = o. The set of
sample paths is denoted by Γ.
The absorption time T : Γ→ Z+ of a sample path g is given by
T (g) , min{t : gt = o}. (3.18)
Thus for all g ∈ Γ, T (g) <∞. Also, gt = o and K(gt, gt+1) = 1 for all t ≥ T (g). Note
that Γ is countable since it is the countable union of the finite sets {g : T (g) = t} for
t = 0, 1, 2, . . ..
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The distribution µπ : P(Γ) → [0, 1] on sample paths under the benchmark SIS

















Also, note that Γ is defined to exclude the set of sample paths that are never absorbed,
{g : gt 6= o,∀t ∈ Z+}. These are infinite sequences that never terminate, and therefore

















Here, Q is the 2n−1×2n−1 sub-stochastic matrix of transition probabilities between
non-absorbing states, and rs(Q) is the s
th row-sum of Q. Hence, rs(Q
t) − rs(Qt+1)
is the probability a sample path starting from state s is absorbed at time t. The
elements of Qt approach zero as t→∞.
Remark 3.2. (Ω,Ω) is a partially ordered set. For s, s′ ∈ Ω, s Ω s′ if si ≤ s′i for
all i ∈ N .
Remark 3.3. (Γ,Γ) is a partially ordered set. For h, g ∈ Γ, h Γ g if ht Ω gt for
all t ∈ Z+.
Next, we present the main result, which constructs a monotone coupling distribu-
tion of νπ, µπ by exploiting the differences in node-level transition probabilities.
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Theorem 3.1. Suppose x, y ∈ Ω with x Ω y. For each i ∈ N , define ϕx,yi : {0, 1}2 →
[0, 1] according to




ϕx,yi (0, 0) = δ(1− pi01(y))
ϕx,yi (0, 1) = δ(p
i
01(y)− pi01,d(x))
ϕx,yi (1, 0) = 0
ϕx,yi (1, 1) = 1− δ(1− pi01,d(x))
(3.19)




ϕx,yi (0, 0) = 1− pi01(y)
ϕx,yi (0, 1) = p
i
01(y)− pi01,d(x)
ϕx,yi (1, 0) = 0
ϕx,yi (1, 1) = p
i
01,d(x)




ϕx,yi (0, 0) = δ(1− pi01(y))
ϕx,yi (0, 1) = 1− pi01,d(x)− δ(1− pi01(y))
ϕx,yi (1, 0) = 0










i) ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω.
Lastly, define Φπ : Γ
2 → [0, 1] for any π ∈ ∆(Ω) by






Then Φπ is a monotone coupling of νπ, µπ.




T (h) T (g)
h
g
Figure 3.8: A pair of sample paths (h, g) drawn from Φπ.
The coupling between node-level transition probabilities ϕx,yi given in (3.19)-(3.20)
are used to establish a coupling between benchmark and distancing probability dis-
tributions on sample paths. The form of the ϕx,yi is identical to the method in which
two biased coins are coupled in (3.15). When the coupling rule is applied to each
node’s probability of infection, it ensures no node can be infected in the distancing
chain while being susceptible in the benchmark chain. Consequently, the monotone
coupling Φπ is a distribution on pairs of sample paths (h, g) satisfying h
0 = g0, h Γ g
(see Figure 3.8) and marginally, h ∼ νπ, g ∼ µπ. The next result characterizes the
difference between µπ and νπ-expectations of any non-negative increasing function on
the sample paths Γ with respect to the coupling distribution Φπ.






τ , Zτ ). (3.21)
where Zτ = {x ∈ Γ : Z(x) > τ}.
Proof. Immediate from Theorem 3.1 and Proposition 3.1. 
One can think of an increasing Z : Γ → Z+ as an epidemic cost metric. Here,
Φπ(Z
c
τ , Zτ ) is simply the probability a benchmark sample path g incurs a cost greater
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than τ , while the corresponding distancing sample path h costs less than τ , where
(h, g) ∼ Φπ. Some examples of increasing Z+-valued random variables in Γ are
• The absorption time T : Γ→ Z+, defined by (3.18).
• Cumulative infected individuals up to time m, defined by g 7→∑mt=0 |gt|, where
|s| ,∑i∈N si for s ∈ Ω.
• The “epidemic spread”, or how many unique nodes that contract the disease in





The difference (3.21) encodes many complex dependencies on the epidemic parameters
δ and β, the awareness weight α, and the structure of the graphs GC and GI .
The following result establishes stochastic domination of the distancing chain by
the benchmark chain.
Corollary 3.3. The benchmark chain stochastically dominates the distancing chain
on sample paths, i.e. µπ  νπ.
Proof. For any upper set I ⊂ Γ, χI(·) is increasing in Γ. By (3.21),
µπ(I)− νπ(I) = Eµπ(χI)− Eνπ(χI)
= Φπ(Ic, I) ≥ 0

This result affirms the intuition that sample paths with consistently higher num-
bers of infected individuals occur with higher probability in the benchmark chain
than in the distancing chain.
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3.6 The value of contact information
We illustrate through numerical simulations how the structure of the contact network
GC affects the course of an epidemic in the presence of awareness and social distancing.
Extensive analytical and simulation studies have been conducted without awareness
[115, 36, 30, 109, 81]. Here, we look at three random graph families - geometric, Erdős-
Rényi, and scale-free. These networks are relevant in studying epidemic spreading
because they exhibit a variety of qualitative features that reflect real-world networks.
Geometric networks portray people connected by geographic distance. Erdős-Rényi
random networks display a small-world effect common in many real world networks -
e.g neural and social influence networks. Online social networks and the World Wide
Web are examples of scale-free networks [69].
In our model, the social network GI is generated directly from GC via a parameter
p ∈ (0, 1) through the following procedure: 1) Select a fraction p of existing edges
in EC at random and remove them from the edge set; 2) For each of the selected
edges, select one of the two end nodes randomly (e.g with probability 1/2) as the
root node; 3) For each of the selected root nodes i, select j 6= i uniformly at random
and add the edge (i, j). For p close to one, the resulting graph GI = (N , EI) exhibits
the small-world effect (small average shortest path length and small clustering) [117].
When p = 0, GI = GC .
For the contact networks, geometric random graphs are generated by placing n
points uniformly at random on the unit torus (unit square with periodic boundary
conditions). An edge exists between any two points if they are less than a specified
distance r ∈ (0, 1) away. Erdős-Rényi random graphs are constructed by forming
an edge between any two nodes independently with a fixed probability pER ∈ (0, 1).
Scale-free networks are generated by the preferential attachment algorithm [12]: start-
ing with an initial connected graph of m0 ≥ m nodes, n −m0 additional nodes are
added sequentially with each incoming node establishing links to m existing nodes in
67
the network. The probability a node receives an incoming link is proportional to its
degree. We performed simulation analysis on one network from each random graph
family. The networks all have 1000 nodes with an average degree of 10, and hence the
same number of edges. This allows us to isolate the effect different network structures
have on epidemic spreading.
In Figure 3.9, the normalized non-trivial fixed points are characterized for the three
random networks in the interval of epidemic persistence. The norms of these points
indicate the size of the endemic states and they slightly overestimate the actual long-
run infected fraction observed in stochastic simulations of the Markov chains. The
condition of Theorem 3.1 guarantees persistence of the epidemic in both benchmark
and awareness models in the mean-field setting. However, the first-order condition
of Theorem 3.1 serves as an upper bound of the exact Markovian epidemic threshold
with respect to the ratio δ/β. Furthermore, the exact threshold is observed to increase
with the addition of awareness.
In Figure 3.10, we quantify the “epidemic spread” by the number of unique nodes
that contract an infection as time progresses when one uniformly random node is
initially infected. This metric is an example of an increasing random variable over
sample paths (Section 3.5) and is helpful in revealing not only how fast an epidemic
initially spreads in the network, but also how far-reaching it is. A key observation
is that contact awareness (p = 0, α = 1) slows epidemic spreading better than any
other awareness configuration at the beginning of an epidemic. This is intuitively
clear since contact awareness provides nodes with the most vital information if they
are in danger of getting infected. As p increases, GI deviates more from GC and the
information nodes receive become less vital.
Erdős-Rényi and scale-free (with m = 5) networks admit disease spread through-
out the entire network in a short amount of time, even with social distancing (Figure




Figure 3.9: Norms of the nontrivial fixed points (solid lines) and long-run fraction
of infected in stochastic simulations (diamonds) in the range of epidemic persistence,
δ/β ∈ [0, λmax(AC)], for n = 1000 node networks. The fixed points are computed
by iterating the MFA dynamics ψ and φ starting from the all infected state (all-ones
n-vector). The stochastic long-run infected fractions are computed by averaging the
levels of epidemic states in the latter half of a sample run of length 200, starting
from the all-infected state. Vertical dashed lines indicate λmax(AC). (a) Erdős-Rényi
random network with pER = .01, λmax(AC) = 11.1. Here, pER > log n/n, the regime
where the network is connected with high probability. (b) Geometric random graph
with r = .0564, λmax(AC) = 16.52. (c) Scale-free generated from the PA algorithm
with m = 5, λmax(AC) = 19.9. The parameters are chosen such that all networks
have the same average degree d = 10.
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Figure 3.10: Epidemic spreading as a function of time (same networks and simulation
setup as Fig. 3.9). Local contact information (α near 1, p near 0) slows spread most
effectively for (a),(c), and the early stages of (b), whereas global information (α near
0 or α = 1, p near 1) is least effective. Note the inversion of awareness effectiveness
in (b). In these simulations, δ = β = 0.2.
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12, [69]), allowing the epidemic to quickly spread to other parts of the network.
Random geometric networks are characterized by high clustering and large diameter.
Clustering slows the spread of an epidemic (Figure 3.10b), but also contributes to
increasing the final epidemic size [112]. The virus stays localized and spreads slowly.
This explains the inversion of awareness parameters in Figure 3.10b. By the time the
epidemic first reaches its endemic level around t = 20, many nodes have not yet been
exposed because at this point their local communities are untouched. Thus, having
global or long-range social awareness (low α or high p) is more beneficial over contact
awareness.
3.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we modified the benchmark networked SIS epidemic process to in-
clude agent awareness, where prevalence-based information comes from social contacts
and a global broadcast of the overall infected fraction. Agents take social distancing
actions based on the level of information received, which reduces their probabili-
ties of getting infected. We showed that awareness does not change the epidemic
threshold for persistence by proving existence of a nontrivial fixed point in the mean-
field approximation. Any nontrivial fixed point of the distancing model is strictly
component-wise less than the unique nontrivial fixed point of the benchmark model.
Therefore, awareness reduces the endemic infection level, but it cannot eradicate the
epidemic. We provided a full stochastic comparison analysis between the benchmark
and distancing chains in terms of their respective probability distributions on sample
paths by constructing a monotone coupling. Consequently, adding awareness reduces
the expectation of any increasing random variable on sample paths and we obtain a
closed form expression for the reduction. This analysis shows that awareness reduces
the expectation of any epidemic cost metric (e.g. time to extinction, total infected
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over time, etc) and the reduction can be given as a closed-form expression. In simula-
tions, we showed epidemic spreading depends on the network structure. In particular,
qualitative features such as small-world effects, clustering, and diameter explain the
results seen in simulations. We also found that local contact awareness is the most
effective at slowing epidemic spread, and global awareness is the least effective.
The importance of local contact information is highlighted through our simula-
tions, and also corroborates with similar studies of the effect of awareness on epidemic
spread [85, 103]. It is unlikely that an individual would know the infection status of
those he comes into physical contact with. Attaining such information would re-
quire great effort on the part of centralized health organizations such as the World
Health Organization and the Center for Disease Control. In particular, one method
that attempts to gather such information is known as contact tracing. This involves
identifying the diagnosis of the people an infected individual comes into contact with.
This process can be quite challenging, requiring a full scale effort for highly contagious
diseases like Ebola [6, 18].
The reactive social distancing mechanism in our model is a heuristic approxima-
tion of individual decision-making that emphasizes their risk-averseness, but does not
take into account other factors such as financial burdens and the actions of their
neighbors. For example, if someone knows his neighbor is sick and is staying home,
there is no reason for him not go out to work that day. Similarly, if an individual
is sick, he will likely stay at home to recover and to not risk spreading the sickness
in public. These tradeoffs are studied in [31] and [92], in which game interactions
and disease dynamics are coupled. Furthermore, our model does not consider higher
order decision-making, such as non-linear distancing functions or basing actions on
memory of past infections. For instance, the intensity of activity reduction can im-
prove upon the epidemic threshold [94, 123]. Additionally, knowledge of epidemic
severity in the past can influence the coupling of disease and vaccination behavior
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[21], giving rise to oscillatory dynamics. In this vein, an area of future work would
be to establish general classes of awareness-induced behavior mechanisms and their
resulting asymptotic outcomes.
The choice to vaccinate is the focus of other models of decision-making in epi-
demic networks [21, 65, 68]. Here, studying the effect of social distancing in isolation
from other preventative measures like vaccination helps to inform the limits of its
effectiveness in reducing epidemic spread [92]. This knowledge is especially valuable
in situations where social distancing actions are relatively cheap (e.g. washing hands
more frequently) compared to producing and distributing vaccines. Furthermore, so-




INFLUENCE OF OPINIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION
A tragedy of the commons occurs when individuals in a population are driven by their
own selfish interests, resulting in the depletion of a common resource on which they
all depend. The interactions that drive such tragedies are modeled in classical game
theory as a prisoner’s dilemma [25, 73, 119]. The rational choice for an individual
is to defect, regardless of what others are doing. However, classical models do not
account for the consequences of action - individual actions affect the environment.
Consequently, the state of the environment may shape individual incentives for future
action. Dynamical models of these coevolutionary features have been developed to
understand general conditions under which tragedies will occur or be averted [119, 17,
95]. Similarly, the study of common-pool resource games suggest that rational play
among larger populations leads to resource collapse with higher probability [43, 91].
In his landmark paper [40], Hardin argues that such tragedies are inevitable given
a growing human population, unless preventative measures are taken. To address the
problem of preventing tragedies, there has been speculation about what intervention
strategies will be effective. Interventions from centralized government entities are
called for, through implementing and enforcing new policies restricting overconsump-
tion [73, 8]. For example, imposing taxes on resource usage may provide a financial
deterrent to overuse [44]. Passing regulatory laws on fishers gives fish populations a
chance to recover [46]. Hence, such direct intervention policies provide the incentives
necessary to instigate conservation behaviors [82].
Information also plays an important role. Individuals may not take pro-environmental
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actions if they are not informed about why such actions are necessary [113]. Envi-
ronmental awareness and education can lead to behavior changes when individuals
realize that environmental degradation has adverse effects on their own community
or household. For example, information from household metering about the severity
of water scarcity drove efforts to conserve water [110]. However, statistics and facts
may be ineffective to instigate behavior changes if such issues are politicized [58]. In
these situations, public opinion is susceptible to propaganda from news outlets and
social media. Environmental information is necessary to affect behavior change, but
may not be sufficient [106, 82, 113]. The efficacy of these proposed solutions are rarely
tested using dynamical models that couple actions and environmental changes [73].
A taxation mechanism on resource investment was studied in the setting of a
common-pool resource game where under certain conditions, higher tax rates can
lead to lower probability of resource collapse [44]. However, asymptotic outcomes are
not considered in this static one-shot game. In a recent work [59], an infinite horizon
optimal control framework was applied to a dynamical model1 to identify conditions
under which an optimal prescribed consumption rate ensures resource sustainability.
However, the consumption rate is not directly manipulated by taxing, pricing, or
other social control policies.
In contrast, we consider in this chapter such direct control policies. We formu-
late optimal control problems that study the role of information and incentive-based
intervention policies with the objective of maximally conserving the environmental
state over a finite time horizon. We apply these control formulations to the model
of ref. [119], due to its general framework. It models a population of myopic indi-
viduals whose actions affect and are affected by the environment. This framework
1Those dynamics can be reduced to a linear system by an appropriate transformation. This differs
fundamentally from the dynamical system considered in this chapter, which is highly nonlinear and
cannot be transformed into a linear system.
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differs from that of differential games [13], where individuals select strategies to maxi-
mize long-term payoffs given action-dependent dynamic environments. To implement
information-based control policies, we introduce a dynamic public opinion that im-
perfectly tracks the true environmental state. We present two formulations in which
the control directly affects public opinion: propaganda strategies that perturb public
opinion, and awareness-raising strategies where learning of the true environmental
state is encouraged. Additionally, we formulate an incentive control problem by al-
lowing an external entity to influence the population’s incentive to cooperate together.
In all three formulations, we compute optimal controls by numerical means (by “op-
timal” in this chapter, we mean locally optimal since the problems we formulate are
nonconvex).
The main contributions and findings of this chapter are 1) the formulation of opti-
mal control problems to address the tragedy of the commons through direct policy in-
terventions and 2) the solutions of these problems, obtained by numerical techniques,
result in highly oscillatory behavior. In particular, we show through simulations that
the objectives of the formulated problems are achieved, at the expense of inducing
highly variant dynamics characterized by oscillatory cycles between low and high re-
source states. First, we briefly review some preliminaries, and the details and main
findings of the game-environment feedback model of [119].
4.1 The prisoner’s dilemma
The rationality of defection or consumption is best explained quantitatively by the
prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. It is a standard model utilized in game theory to
show that following selfish interests result in sub-optimal outcomes for all. The PD
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Players choose between two actions, cooperate (C) or defect (D). When both players
cooperate (strategy profile (C, C)), both are rewarded a payoff R. When a cooperator
plays against a defector (C,D), it receives the sucker’s payoff S while the defector
receives the tempting payoff T . When both players defect (D,D), they receive a
punishment payoff P . The payoff structure follows T > R > P > S, and without loss
of generality, we assume all payoff parameters are positive. A player’s optimal action
is D regardless of the other player’s action. Hence, the only pure Nash equilibrium
is mutual defection, (D,D). The rational choice induces a suboptimal outcome since
they would receive a better payoff (R) if they had both cooperated.
4.2 Co-evolutionary game theory
In this section, we outline the formulation of the dynamical model of [119]. It modifies
a replicator equation of two strategies (cooperate and defect) by introducing environ-
mental feedback. The actions of individuals in the population have consequences on
the environment and as a result, shape individual incentives in the future.
4.2.1 The replicator dynamics
The replicator equation describes evolutionary dynamics of strategy frequencies in a
well-mixed, infinite population [118, 99]. Under this dynamic, strategies proliferate
in the population if their fitnesses exceed the average population fitness, and decline
if they do not. Hence, success in the replicator dynamic is relative.
In its most general form, the replicator dynamics for n strategies are given by
ẋi = xi(fi(x)− f̄(x)), i = 1, . . . , n (4.2)
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where xi ≥ 0 is the frequency of strategy i in the population, fi(x) is the expected fit-
ness to an individual in the population adopting strategy i when the population state
is x = [x1, . . . , xn], and f̄(x) =
∑n
i=1 xifi(x) is the average fitness of the population.
Since
∑
i ẋi = 0, the population size remains constant. Without loss of generality,
∑
i xi(t) = 1, ∀t. Hence, the population dynamics evolve over the n-dimensional sim-
plex: x(t) ∈ ∆n ≡ {x ∈ Rn|
∑
i xi = 1, xi ≥ 0},∀t. A strategy i is said to be extinct
if xi = 0. By (4.2), an extinct strategy cannot re-enter the population.
To illustrate the replicator equation for the prisoner’s dilemma game (4.1), we note
there are two strategies, cooperate (C) or defect (D). Therefore, we can describe the
composition of the population with a single state x, the fraction of cooperators. The
fraction of defectors is then 1−x. A proportion x of interactions of an individual are
with cooperators, and 1−x with defectors. Consequently, the fitnesses of a cooperator
and defector are
fC(x) = Rx+ S(1− x) (cooperator fitness)
fD(x) = Tx+ P (1− x) (defector fitness)
Using (4.2), the evolution of cooperators is
ẋ = x(fC(x)− f̄(x))
= x(fC(x)− xfC(x)− (1− x)fD(x))
= x(1− x)(fC(x)− fD(x))
Given the payoff structure R < T and S < P , fC(x) < fD(x) ∀x, and hence ẋ < 0.
Therefore, cooperation dies out in the population and defectors dominate.
4.2.2 A model of replicator dynamics with environmental feedback
The replicator equation provides evolutionary outcomes for the games often studied in
classical game theory such as the prisoner’s dilemma. It does not, however, address
the long-term impact individual actions have on the environment. Defectors who
consume public resources without cooperating to conserve it will eventually have no
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resource to consume. Realistically, incentives for future actions change as a result of
re-shaping the environment. Here, we introduce the model of [119], which incorporates
a game-environment feedback into the replicator equation. This model is intended
to provide a general framework in which to portray the dynamics of tragedy of the
commons scenarios.
The model introduces an “environment” variable n ∈ [0, 1] where n = 0 means
the environment is in a deplete state and n = 1 means it is in a replete state. The
game-environment coupled dynamics obey the following differential equations.
ẋ = x(1− x)(fC(x, n)− fD(x, n))
ṅ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
Here, the n(1 − n) term indicates a logistic growth of the environmental state, and
serves to constrain the dynamics n(t) ∈ [0, 1]. The growth or decline of the environ-
ment depends on the frequency x of cooperators in the population, who restore n at
a rate θ > 0. We assume the payoff matrix An that underlies individual interactions




















When n = 1, we impose that defection is the dominant strategy, that is, R1 < T1
and S1 < P1. Hence the only pure Nash equilibrium in the game defined by the
payoff matrix A1 is mutual defection, where players obtain a payoff P1. We leave
the structure of the game in the depleted state, defined by the payoff matrix A0,
unconstrained in order to explore the possible asymptotic outcomes of the system.
The coevolutionary process between strategy frequencies and environmental state is
illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Thus, the fitnesses for cooperators and defectors are
fC(x, n) = Rnx+ Sn(1− x) (cooperator fitness)
fD(x, n) = Tnx+ Pn(1− x) (defector fitness).
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Figure 4.1: (Reproduced from [119]) Illustration of the feedback between strategy
frequencies x and environmental state n. The payoff matrix is a function of n and
determines the evolution of strategists in the population. As a result, the change in
strategists influences the environmental state, causing a feedback loop of coevolution-
ary dynamics.
and the difference of the fitness of cooperators to defectors is
g(x, n) ≡ fC(x, n)− fD(x, n)
= xn((R1 − S1 − T1 + P1)− (R0 − S0 − T0 + P0)) + x(R0 − S0 − T0 + P0)
+ n((P0 − S0)− (P1 − S1))− (P0 − S0)
(4.3)
We denote the state vector y(t) ≡ [x(t), n(t)]> and the system mapping as F :
[0, 1]2 → R2. In this notation, we re-write the system dynamics as




n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)


x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, 1], n(0) = n0 ∈ [0, 1]
(4.4)
There are four “corner” fixed points, (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1). When x = 0,
the trajectory is confined to the left edge of the state space, and converges to the
equilibrium (0,0). When x = 1, it is on the right edge and converges to (1,1). When
n = 0, the dynamics follow a replicator dynamic corresponding to the base game A0,
and when n = 1, the dynamic converges to (0,1) since this corresponds to replicator
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dynamics of the PD game. However, because the set (0, 1)2 is an invariant set of
these dynamics, we focus our attention on stability properties of trajectories starting
in the interior of the state space.
4.2.3 Summary of possible dynamics in feedback-evolving games
The asymptotic behavior of the system (4.4) relies on the choice of the payoff param-
eters R0, S0, T0, and P0 of the game A0. There are seven possible dynamical regimes,
and they are summarized and named in Figure 4.2. The outcomes that are possible
include a tragedy of the commons (TOC1 - TOC4), aversion of TOC (V1 and V2),
and an “oscillating” TOC (OTOC). We present here analysis of one particular dy-
namical regime of note, where the system exhibits periodic orbits or asymptotically
stable heteroclinic cycles. These dynamical outcomes are termed “oscillating tragedy
of the commons” [119] because they are characterized by cycles between replete and
deplete environmental states. The incentive structures required for these outcomes
are stated in the following results.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose S0 > P0 and R0 > T0. That is, mutual cooperation is








In Figure 4.2, these payoffs correspond to the points on the line that separate the
OTOC and V2 regions. The trajectories of the dynamics in this regime are shown in
Figure 4.3.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose S0 > P0 and R0 > T0. That is, mutual cooperation is the
unique Nash equilibrium of the game A0. Then the heteroclinic cycle Λ, defined by

















Figure 4.2: (Adapted from [119]) Summary of all possible dynamical outcomes given
choice of payoffs in deplete state. The regions are determined by the relative payoffs
S0 − P0 (x-axis) and R0 − T0 (y-axis). The phase portraits are illustrated in each
region, where blue dots indicate stable fixed points of the dynamics. The seven regions
include outcomes where a tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs, and where a TOC
is averted. We assign labels to each region, which includes four TOC outcomes, two
averted outcomes (V1 and V2), and one oscillating TOC.
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Figure 4.3: Solutions of x(t), n(t) in the regime specified by Proposition 4.1. (Left)
Time series portrayal shows persistent oscillations. (Right) The (x(t), y(t)) trajec-
tory traces out a closed orbit in the phase plane. Here, [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [6, 4, 3, 3],
[R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], θ = 0.7, and [x0, n0] = [0.2, 0.4].
These payoffs correspond to the region OTOC in Figure 4.2. The trajectories
of the dynamics in this regime are shown in Figure 4.4. A heteroclinic cycle is a
set of equilibrium points connected by heteroclinic orbits, i.e. a path connecting
two equilibrium points. In this system, the heteroclinic cyle is defined by the four
corner equilibria points connected in the following order: (0,0), (1,0), (1,1), (1,0),
and returning to (0,0). When such a cycle is asymptotically stable, state trajectories
spend longer and longer times near the equilibrium points before going away to the
next one in the cycle. We provide the proofs of these Propositions in Appendix 4.A.
The stability properties of fixed points in the other dynamical regimes, along with
their proofs, are also presented there.
4.3 A model of public opinion about the environment
Here, we introduce a model where the population responds to a public opinion of the
environment instead of the true environmental state. Using this model, we investigate
information control control policies aimed to influence the public opinion in order to
maximally conserve the environmental state.
We build upon the feedback-evolving game model by introducing a public opinion
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Figure 4.4: Solutions of x(t), n(t) in the regime specified by Proposition 4.2. (Left)
Time series portrayal shows growing oscillations. (Right) The (x(t), y(t)) trajectory
spirals outward towards the boundary of the state space, which defines a heteroclinic
cycle. Here, [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [10, 4, 3, 3], [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], θ = 0.7, and
[x0, n0] = [0.2, 0.4].
variable o(t). This variable is interpreted to be the average public opinion about the
environmental state in the population, and it is a value between 0 and 1. For o = 0,
all individuals in the population believe the environment is completely depleted, and
when o = 1, they believe the environment is at a fully replete state. We introduce
the following dynamics to model how opinions change in the population.
ẋ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
ṅ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
ȯ = −γ(o− n)
[x(0), n(0), o(0)] = [x0, n0, o0] ∈ (0, 1)3
where γ > 0. The form of the ȯ equation induces o(t) to track the environmental
state n(t). There is a lag between actual changes in the environment and the public
becoming informed about the changes. The learning parameter γ > 0 determines how
slow this lag is. For γ low, o(t) will not adapt quickly enough to the fluctuating n(t).
As γ increases, o(t) more successfully tracks n(t). The ẋ equation above is modified
from the previous section by replacing the relative fitness g(x, n) with g(x, o). Here,
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individual incentives are now determined by the current public opinion and not the
true environmental state n. We denote this system with the mapping F o, which is
written








where y = [x, n, o]> is the state vector. The previous feedback-evolving game dy-
namics F (4.4) can be interpreted here as a population that has perfect knowledge
of the environmental state. We illustrate the effect delayed public opinion has on the
original dynamics in Figure 4.5 in three distinct regimes. A notable effect occurs in
the V2 regime, where the original dynamics admits a stable interior fixed point at
(1/(1 + θ), nc), where
nc ≡
(R0 − T0) + θ(S0 − P0)
(R0 − T0) + θ(S0 − P0) + (T1 −R1) + θ(P1 − S1)
.
With public opinion, the (x(t), n(t)) trajectories of the system F o are pushed
towards the boundary of the state space (x, n) ∈ [0, 1]2. This is due to the delay in
opinion, and the intuition is as follows. When n(t) starts to increase towards a peak,
o(t) lags behind and stays below n(t). This causes more of the population to become
cooperators, since they are responding to the low public opinion and not the true
environmental state. As a result, n(t) is restored more than it would have been if the
population had perfect information. As o(t) tracks increases in n(t), the population
starts to defect, degrading the environment. Opinion starts to decline as well, causing
a resurgence in cooperation. This process continues to repeat, causing larger and
larger oscillations. The delay of opinion causes an imbalance in population response
because individuals are responding to exaggerated opinions of the environment.
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Figure 4.5: Comparison of public opinion-induced dynamics (Left column) and
the original feedback-evolving game (Right column). (Top row) [R0, S0, T0, P0] =
[5, 2, 3, 3] (regime TOC1). Delay of opinion does not help to restore the commons.
(Middle row) [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [4.5, 4, 3, 3] (regime V2). Delayed opinion destabilizes
the interior fixed point. (Bottom row) [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [7, 4, 3, 3] (regime OTOC).
Public opinion facilitates convergence to heteroclinic cycle in the (x, n) trajectories.
In all simulations, [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], γ = .5, θ = .5, x0 = .5, n0 = .3, o0 = .3.
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4.4 Opinion influence policies for conservation
Using the population opinion model of the previous section, in this section we consider
an external entity, e.g. media platforms, politicians, activists, and central figures, that
has an influence over public opinion about the environment. We numerically charac-
terize control policies intended to influence public opinion with the goal of conserv-
ing the environmental state by utilizing an optimal control algorithm. We consider
two types of information control policies by formulating two optimal control prob-
lems. First, we study strategic policies that perturb public opinions externally. These
types of strategies inject information to sway public opinion. For example, propa-
ganda, activist campaigns, and media broadcasts can achieve such perturbations. We
then consider policies that facilitate public learning of the true environmental state.
These strategies raise awareness about the environment and serve to reduce uncer-
tainty about the environmental state. For example, the EPA conducts environmental
education programs2.
Before proceeding, we outline a Hamiltonian-based descent algorithm (Algorithm
3.3 of [39]) that we utilize in both optimal control problems. The algorithm serves
to numerically compute a control function u(t) that locally maximizes the objective













subject to ẏ = F o(y, u)
where L(n, u) ≡ 1
2
(C1n
2−C2u2) is the running cost, Tf > 0 is the finite time horizon,
and C1, C2 > 0 are weighting constants. The C1n
2 term rewards accumulation of the
environmental state. The −C2u2 term penalizes control effort. The controlled state
dynamics F o(y, u) will be specified for the two problems we consider. Both problems
2https://www.epa.gov/education/what-environmental-education
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will be in Bolza form with no terminal cost. The Hamiltonian is
H(y,λ, u) = λ>F o(y, u) + L(n, u)
where F o(y, u), the controlled state dynamics, will be different for the two problems
we consider. Here, λ = [λx, λn, λo]
> are the costate variables. The costates are













with final condition λ(Tf ) = [0, 0, 0]
>
(4.7)
The final conditions are all zero because of the absence of a terminal cost. The itera-
tive algorithm of [39] leverages Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle and the Hamiltonian
to find ascent directions for the control function. The algorithm operates as follows.
Algorithm 4.1. Set the number of iterations iters, a positive integer. Fix constants
α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1). These are used for the Armijo step search [7].
1. Start with an initial guess for the control function, u0, and set k = 0.
2. At iteration k, compute the state trajectory yk by solving the system dynamics
F o(y, uk) using a forward integration method. Then, using these trajectories
and the current control iterate uk, compute the costate trajectories λk (4.7) by
using a backward integration method.




4. (Armijo step search) Compute the smallest integer ` = 0, 1, . . ., such that
J(uk)− J(uk + β`(u∗k − uk)) ≤ αβ`Θ(uk)
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(H(y,λ, u)−H(y,λ, u∗))dt ≤ 0
where the trajectories y and λ correspond to the control u.
5. Update
uk+1 = uk + β
`(u∗ − uk)
and k ← k + 1. If k > iters, exit algorithm. If not, return to step 2.
The value of |Θ(uk)| measures how far from optimality the current iterate is, in
the sense of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle. When it is zero, the conditions of
Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle are met.
4.4.1 Influence through propaganda
We consider strategic policies that perturb public opinions externally by introducing
new, artificial information into the population. To this end, we formulate the following
finite time horizon (Tf ) optimal control problem, with u(t) ∈ R for all t ∈ [0, Tf ] as











ẋ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
ṅ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
ȯ = −γ(o− n) + o(1− o)u
(4.8)
The additive control term o(1−o)u serves two purposes. First, it keeps the dynamics
well-posed, i.e. a solution o(t) that starts in [0, 1] will stay in [0, 1]. Second, it models
the difficulty to influence extreme opinions. The additive term decreases to zero as
o approaches the extremes 0 and 1, and hence more external influence is required to
move public opinion away from the extremes. The system dynamics of the above are
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denoted here as ẏ = F o(y, u). An information control policy must balance the costs
of spreading misinformation, e.g. public broadcasts, with its benefits.
To implement Algorithm 4.1, we first need to compute the co-state equations
λ̇x = −λx
(




− λnn(1− n)(1 + θ)
λ̇n = −λn(1− 2n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)− λoγ − C1n
λ̇o = −λxx(1− x)
∂g
∂o
(x)− λo(−γ + u(1− 2o))





(o) = (1− o)((R0 − T0) + (P0 − S0)) + o((R1 − T1) + (P1 − S1))
∂g
∂o
(x) = (1− x)((P0 − S0)− (P1 − S1)) + x((R1 − T1)− (R0 − T0)).
The Hamiltonian can be written
H(y,λ, u) = λ>ẏ + L(n, u)






The above expression is concave in u. Hence, the point-wise (in time) maximizer
of the Hamiltonian is calculated by finding where the partial derivative of H with





We applied Algorithm 4.1 to the control problem (4.8). We initialized all simulations
with the initial control guess u(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, Tf ], fixed payoffs [R1, S1, T1, P1] =
[3, 1, 6, 2], and initial conditions [x0, n0, o0]
> = [.5, .3, .3]. We utilized RK4-based
integration methods (ode45 for forward integration and RK4 for backwards), with
uniform spacing .001 for the time variable.
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We characterize the efficacy of information injection policies through a suite of
simulations applying the control algorithm to the different dynamical regimes. In
all of the simulations we conduct, we fix the priority weight C1 = 1, and study
modifications to the penalty weight C2. First, a notable observation was that the
environmental state could be rescued in the TOC1 regime for a limited time if penalty
on effort was extremely low (C2 = .001). When the cost weights are more balanced,
e.g. C2 = 1, we did not observe resurgence of the commons in any of the TOC regimes
after implementation of Algorithm 4.1. In the other regimes, the control applies its
effort into pushing o(t) lower. In the cases we have studied, the algorithm produces
controls u(t) that are negative throughout the time horizon.
In regime V2 (Figure 4.6), when control effort is cheap (C2 = 0.1), the computed
control concentrates effort in waves, occurring near the peaks of the oscillations.
The control starts very negative, leading to a decrease in o(t) in the first few time
steps. This produces a trough in the o(t) oscillation that is slightly lower than n(t),
resulting in a resurgence of cooperators. The control then relaxes its effort as the
states o(t), n(t) begin to increase, approaching the next peak (time 10). At this peak,
information is applied to drive o(t) higher, resulting in a resurgence of defectors. This
process is repeated again for the next cycle, causing larger oscillations in the state
variables.
In the OTOC regime, control effort is applied in a similar manner, but with more
selective pushes. In Figure 4.7 (Top right), there are two concentrated efforts to push
o(t) lower at t ≈ 5 and t ≈ 30. Both pushes are followed by relaxations in effort,
returning to u ≈ 0. This control intervention facilitates an oscillating tragedy of
the commons. However, the magnitudes of these pushes are small due to the higher
penalty C2 = 1. When the penalty is relaxed to C2 = 0.001 (Figure 4.8), all control
effort is concentrated at the beginning, and immediately relaxes to near zero for the
rest of the time horizon. This causes o(t) to shoot down, leading to a sudden surge
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in cooperators and consequently restoration of the environment. The relaxation of
the control causes o(t) to eventually track the high value of n(t), leading to a sudden
resurgence in defectors at t ≈ 40. Beyond the time horizon Tf = 50 and in the absence
of additional control, the defector dominance will eventually lead to a collapse of the
environmental state.
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Figure 4.6: Results for information injection problem in the V2 regime (stable interior
fixed point) with effort penalty C2 = 0.1. The initial control guess was u(t) = 0,
[R0, S0, T0, P0] = [4.5, 4, 3, 3], [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], γ = 1, θ = .5, x0 = .5,
n0 = .3, o0 = .3, Tf = 50. We ran the algorithm for 80 iterations. (Top left) The
controlled state dynamics produce an oscillating tragedy of the commons. (Top right)
The objective function J approaches saturation. (Bottom left) The control function
at iteration 80. (Bottom right) Optimality function converges to near zero, indicating
a local maximum.
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Figure 4.7: Results for information injection problem in the OTOC regime (stable
heteroclinic cycle) with effort penalty C2 = 1. The initial control guess was u(t) = 0,
[R0, S0, T0, P0] = [7, 4, 3, 3], [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], γ = 1, θ = .5, x0 = .5, n0 = .3,
o0 = .3, Tf = 50. We ran the algorithm for 20 iterations. (Top left) With additive
control, state dynamics produce an oscillating tragedy of the commons. (Top right)
The objective function J approaches saturation. (Bottom left) The control function
at iteration 20. (Bottom right) Optimality function converges to near zero, indicating
a local maximum.
94
Figure 4.8: Results for information injection problem in the OTOC regime (stable
heteroclinic cycle) with effort penalty C2 = .001. The initial control guess was u(t) =
0, [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [7, 4, 3, 3], [R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], γ = 1, θ = .5, x0 = .5,
n0 = .3, o0 = .3, Tf = 50. We ran the algorithm for 20 iterations. (Top left) With
additive control, state dynamics produce an oscillating tragedy of the commons. (Top
right) The objective function J approaches saturation. (Bottom left) The control
function at iteration 20. (Bottom right) The value of the optimality function at
iteration 80 is -0.008347, indicating a local maximum.
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4.4.2 Influence through raising awareness
We now consider strategic information policies that guide public opinion towards the
true environmental state. Environmental awareness and educational campaigns are
examples of interventions that serve this purpose. Using Algorithm 4.1, we wish
to numerically characterize how such policies are should be applied to conserve the
environmental state. We formulate the following finite time-horizon optimal control











u(t) ∈ [0,∞) ∀t ∈ [0, Tf ]
ẋ = x(1− x)g(x, o)
ṅ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
ȯ = −(γ + u)(o− n)
(4.9)
In this formulation, we have constrained the control to be non-negative for all times.
This serves two purposes. First, it ensures the dynamics will be well-posed, i.e. all
states stay within the interval (0, 1). Second, it restricts the influencing entity from
mis-educating the public since the learning parameter γ + u(t) ≥ γ for all t.








− λnn(1− n)(1 + θ)
λ̇n = −λn(1− 2n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)− λo(γ + u)− C1n
λ̇o = −λxx(1− x)
∂g
∂o
(x) + λo(γ + u)
with final condition λ(Tf ) = [0, 0, 0]
>. The Hamiltonian is







The above expression is concave in u, where the relevant term is −u(λo(o − n) +
(1/2)C2u). If the maximizer u
∗ of this term is positive, then the maximizer takes
that value. If it is negative or zero, our constraint restricts u∗ to zero. Hence, the
point-wise (in time) maximizer of the Hamiltonian is written as






0 if− (1/C2)λo(o− n) < 0
−(1/C2)λo(o− n) if − (1/C2)λo(o− n) ≥ 0
We applied Algorithm 4.1 to the control problem (4.9). In these simulations, we
lower γ = 0.5 to increase delay between public opinion o(t) and enviornmental state
n(t). We find that even with low penalty on control effort C2 = .001 and priority on
conservation C1 = 1, the computed controls were unable to induce a resurgence of the
commons in all TOC regimes. In the other regimes, the control applies public opinion
guidance effort near critical points in the time horizon. To illustrate these effects, we
present the outcomes in the dynamical regimes V2 and OTOC. We initialized all
simulations with the initial control guess u(t) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, Tf ], fixed payoffs
[R1, S1, T1, P1] = [3, 1, 6, 2], initial conditions [x0, n0, o0]
> = [.5, .3, .3], selected the
learning paramter γ = 0.5, and fixed conservation priority C1 = 1.
We characterize the efficacy of awareness policies in the problem (4.9) through
a suite of simulations applying Algorithm 4.1 to the different dynamical regimes.
In all of the simulations we conduct, we fix the priority weight C1 = 1, and study
modifications to the penalty weight C2. We find that even with low penalty on control
effort C2 = .001, the computed awareness policies were unable to induce a resurgence
of the commons in all TOC regimes.
In regime V2 (Figure 4.9), we set an inexpensive control effort (C2 = .001). The
computed control (Bottom left) raises public awareness of the true environmental
state only at a few critical moments in the time horizon. These moments occur near
the first few extrema of the n(t) oscillations. Because opinion lags the true state, o(t)
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underestimates n(t) when they are increasing and overestimates n(t) when decreasing.
The sudden injection of awareness allows o(t) to quickly track the more extreme value
of n(t) near the critical points, inducing higher and higher oscillations of o(t). This
effect is most notably seen in the first peak of o(t) (Top left).
Figure 4.10 shows an application of the algorithm in the OTOC regime. Here
we also set C2 = .001. A similar principle holds for the computed controller here
as well. An initial spike in influence causes opinion to quickly shoot up to meet the
higher n(t). The controller immediately relaxes, causing o(t) to overestimate n(t) as
it decreases. A second spike at t ≈ 7.5 causes opinion to shoot down to meet the lower
n(t), now at a trough. No more control is applied for the rest of the horizon, but the
two perturbations cause o(t) to approach more extreme values in its oscillations (Left
panels).
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Figure 4.9: Simulation results for the awareness control problem in the V2 regime (sta-
ble interior fixed point) with very low penalization C2 = .001. Here, [R0, S0, T0, P0] =
[4.5, 4, 3, 3], γ = 0.5, θ = .5, x0 = .5, n0 = .3, o0 = .3, Tf = 50. (Top left) The
controlled states resemble an oscillating tragedy of the commons. (Top right) The
objective function J approaches saturation after 80 iterations. (Bottom left) The
control function at iteration 80. (Bottom right) The value of the optimality function
at iteration 80 is ≈ −4× 10−5, indicating a local maximum.
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Figure 4.10: Simulation results for the awareness control problem in the OTOC
regime (stable heteroclinic cycle) with very low penalization C2 = .001. Here,
[R0, S0, T0, P0] = [7, 4, 3, 3], γ = 0.5, θ = .5, x0 = .5, n0 = .8, o0 = .7, Tf = 50.
(Top left) The controlled states resemble an oscillating tragedy of the commons.
(Top right) The objective function J approaches saturation. (Bottom left) The con-
trol function at iteration 80. Here it is displayed on [0, 10] to magnify the shape of
the first spike. The control u(t) is also zero for the rest of the horizon. (Bottom right)
The value of Θ at iteration 80 here is ≈ −4.29× 10−5, indicating a local maximum.
100
4.5 Incentive policies for conservation
In this section, we consider a different type of strategic policy - one that influences
individuals’ incentives to cooperate together with the goal of conserving public re-
sources. For example, government entities may incentivize fishers to refrain from















We will constrain u(t) ∈ [−um, um] ≡ U for all t, where um > 0 is a positive constant.











ẋ = x(1− x)g(x, n) + x2(1− x)(1− n)u
ṅ = n(1− n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x)
x(0) = x0 ∈ [0, 1], n(0) = n0 ∈ [0, 1]
(4.10)
Note that we are here using the original feedback-evolving game (without opinions).
The affine term x2(1−x)(1−n) appears after re-deriving the replicator equation with




(1− 2x)g(x, n) + x(1− x)∂g(n)
∂x
+ x(2− 3x)(1− n)u
)







− λn(1− 2n)(−1 + (1 + κ)x)− 2n
and the Hamiltonian
H(y,λ, u) = λxx(1−x)(g(x, n) +x(1−n)u) +λnn(1−n)(−1 + (1 +κ)) +n2 (4.11)
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Because the affine term x2(1− x)(1− n) is always positive, the pointwise maximizer
of the Hamiltonian is
u∗(t) = umsgn(λx(t)) (4.12)
The maximizer u∗(t) will only take two values, the minimum and maximum points
in the constraint set U = [−um, um]. As long as λx(t) = 0 does not occur on an open
interval in the time horizon [0, Tf ], u
∗(t) is classified as a “bang-bang” controller. We
will shortly prove that this is indeed true, using the Lie bracket (Ch. 4.4 of [55]).
We applied Algorithm 4.1 with the parameters [R0, S0, T0, P0] = [4.5, 4, 3, 3],
[R, S, T, P ] = [3, 1, 6, 2] (regime V2), um = 1, Tf = 100, θ = 0.7, [x0, n0] = [0.7, 0.3]
>.
Shown in Figure 4.11 is the result of 40 iterations of the algorithm with initial con-
trol guess u0(t) = 0. The computed control converges to a local maximum, indi-
cated numerically by convergence of the optimality function Θ to zero. This con-
troller appears to switch values near the times where n(t) peaks. At these peaks,
x(t) = xc = 1/(1 + θ). In doing so, the controlled dynamics exhibit growing os-
cillations, in a regime (V2) where uncontrolled dynamics settle at an interior fixed
point.
We run a second simulation (Figure 4.12 with the same parameter set, but select
the initial guess u0 = umsgn(x− xc) because we suspect such a controller is effective
at driving growing oscillations in the system. Again, the algorithm produces a local
maximum, as indicated numerically by convergence of the optimality function Θ to
zero. The resulting controller after 40 iterations has deviated only slightly away from
u0, and the improvement in performance by the end is only marginally improved
(29.84 to 29.97). This controller outperforms the computed control from the first
simulation, where the initial guess was the zero function.
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Figure 4.11: Result of Algorithm 4.1 applied to the incentive control problem. We set
the initial guess u0(t) = 0. At minimal and maximal control (u = ±1), the dynamic
still remains in regime V2. (Top Left) The cooperator dynamics x(t) overlayed with
the computed control u40(t) at iteration 40. (Top Right) Environment dynamics
n(t). The control u40 switches near the critical times where ṅ(t) = 0. (Bottom Left)
Objective scores J(uk) =
∫ Tf
0
n2(t)dt versus iteration number k. The score approaches
a maximal value (≈ 26). (Bottom Right) The optimality function θ(uk) vs iteration
number k.
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Figure 4.12: Same set-up as Figure 1, but with initial control guess u0 = umsgn(x−
xc). (Top Right) Environment dynamics n(t). The control u40 switches near the




versus iteration number k. The score approaches a maximal value (≈ 30), which is
slightly higher than Figure 1 setup. Hence, we observe this local max performs better.
(Bottom Right) The optimality function θ(uk) vs iteration number k.
104
4.5.1 Lie bracket analysis - non-singular bang-bang incentive control
Here, we analyze the Lie bracket of the incentive-based controlled dynamics (4.10) to
show that an optimal control u∗ (4.12) that satisfies the conditions of Pontryagin’s
Maximum Principle is indeed a bang-bang controller. This amounts to showing that
there are no singular arcs - i.e. there does not exist an open interval in which the
switching function is zero. See Chapter 4.4.3 of [55] for the relevant theory. Our
controlled system dynamics (4.10) are control-affine, and can be written in the form
ẏ = F (y) +G(y)u where y = [x, n]>. The affine term is
G(x, n) = [x2(1− x)(1− n), 0]>
The switching function in our control problem is
ϕ(t) ≡ 〈λ, G(x, n)〉 = λxx2(1− x)(1− n)





um, if ϕ(t) > 0
× if ϕ(t) = 0
−um, if ϕ(t) < 0
where × indicates u∗ can take an arbitrary value. The time derivative of the switching
function is ϕ̇ = 〈λ, (DG)F − (DF )G〉 = 〈λ, [F,G]〉, where [F,G] = (DG)F − (DF )G























g(x, n)(2− 3x)− n(−1 + (1 + κ)x)−
(
(1− 2x)g(x, n) + x(1− x) ∂g
∂x
)
−n(1− n)(1 + κ)


We can rule out singularity of u∗ (ϕ(t) = 0 on an open interval) if G and [F,G] are
linearly independent. Since (x, n) ∈ (0, 1)2 (invariance of the interior of state space)










g(x, n)(2− 3x)− n(−1 + (1 + κ)x)−
(
(1− 2x)g(x, n) + x(1− x) ∂g
∂x
)
−n(1− n)(1 + κ)


Since the second entry of the right vector is always non-zero, these two vectors are
linearly independent, and we conclude that u∗ is a non-singular control. In other
words, ϕ(t) = 〈λ, G〉 and ϕ̇(t) = 〈λ, [F,G]〉 cannot both be zero at the same time.
Therefore, there are no singular arcs for the controller u∗ that satisfies the properties
of Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle.
4.6 Discussion
In this chapter, we extended the game-environment feedback model of [119] with a
dynamic public opinion state. The public opinion imperfectly tracks the true envi-
ronmental state, creating a lag between changes in the environment and changes in
opinion. Due to this lag, the dynamics can become destabilized in regimes from the
original model where an intermediate population and resource state is stable.
We leveraged this extension to investigate information-based policies that encour-
age the population to accumulate common resources. We considered two ways public
opinion can be influenced. The first is a propaganda-like intervention where an exter-
nal influencing agent attempts to sway public opinion. The second aims to accurately
inform the public of the current true environmental state, e.g. through environmental
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education programs or awareness campaigns. For each of these scenarios, we formu-
late an optimal control problem where the objective is to maximize accumulation of
the environment state. We used a Hamiltonian-based optimal control algorithm [39]
to numerically characterize locally optimal control strategies. We find that the propa-
ganda strategies’ ability to restore the environment in the cases of inevitable tragedy
is limited. When control effort is costly, the return on investment from spreading
information is not worth the benefit. In other dynamical regimes, these policies al-
ways bias public opinion towards lower environmental states to instigate cooperative
behavior. However, because there are costs for control effort, the injection of in-
formation is done at strategic times. Similar conclusions hold for awareness-based
policies, in which learning of the true environment is encouraged when public opinion
overestimates the true state. We also demonstrated incentive-based policies induce
a similar outcome. Hence, our simulation study points to a general scheme of in-
fluencing public opinion to accumulate common resources - drive the system to an
oscillating tragedy of the commons by concentrating influence effort near the critical
points of the dynamics.
The resulting oscillating tragedy of the commons maximizes accumulation of com-
mon resources over a finite time horizon because the policies increase the amount of
time spent at replete states. The major drawback is the common resource will col-
lapse. These effects are extremely undesirable if there are no alternative resource
options. Hence, different ways of thinking about control are necessary. How should
objective functions be specified to reduce extreme variation while maintaining stabil-
ity of the common resource? Perhaps priority needs to be placed on the population’s
well-being in addition to conserving the commons [59]. The information policies we
studied generally are unable to revive the commons in regimes where tragedy is in-
evitable. It remains to show whether combination policies such as influencing the
population’s opinion and incentive are sufficient to avert a tragedy of the commons.
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Such policies are called for by researchers in the social sciences, who argue that in-
formation and incentives are each individually necessary, but insufficient [82, 113]
Our formulation of public opinion serves to describe how a population’s overall
perception of the environment can dynamically change over time. Here, the indi-
vidual payoffs are modulated by perception and hence agents’ decisions are solely
driven by controlled beliefs. Specific aspects of an individual’s decision-making pro-
cess are abstracted here. We point the interested reader to relevant works that study
these considerations in common-pool resource scenarios [60, 43], where separate game-
theoretic and cognitive analyses are called for. In our model, the agents experience
perceived payoffs. An alternate formulation may involve the partially informed agents
changing their environmental opinions, and hence future action, upon experiencing
actual (n-dependent) payoffs. This presents an opportunity for further study - opin-
ionated agents with payoff-based reasoning capabilities can shape how perceptions
change, and in turn, the application of information-based control.
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Appendix
4.A Stability proofs of dynamical regimes
The proofs in this Appendix section are adapted from the Supplementary materials
of [119].
Proof of Proposition 4.1 - periodic orbits
To prove this result, we need to consider the following energy function,
M(x, n) = −δPS [log n+ log(1− n)]−log x−
θ
1 + ∆
log(1−x)+ 1 + ∆ + θ
1 + ∆
log(1+∆x)
where δPS = P1 − S1, and δTR = T1 − R1, and ∆ = δTRδPS − 1. We state the following
lemma, regarding the level curves of H.
Lemma 4.1. For an arbitrary point (x0, n0) ∈ (0, 1)2, the set
{(x, n) ∈ (0, 1)2 : M(x, n) = M(x0, n0)}















B(θ,∆, x) = log x+
θ
1 + ∆
log(1− x)− 1 + ∆ + θ
1 + ∆
log(1 + ∆x)
Proof. The parameterization n±(x) is obtained by setting M(x0, n0) = M(x, n), and
solving for n. We get
M(x0, n0)−B(θ,∆, x)
δPS
= log n+ log(1− n)
Taking the exponential and using the quadratic equation, we obtain (4.13). 
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Proof of Proposition 4.1. Under the conditions of this result (4.5), the ẋ equation can
be written as
ẋ = δPS(1− 2n)x(1− x)(1 + ∆x)

































ẋ = δPS(1− 2n)
[
(1− x)(1 + ∆x)− θ
1 + ∆




The x2 term inside the square bracket is zero, the x1 term is −(1 + θ), and the




ṅ = −δPS(1 − 2n)(−1 + (1 + θ)x). Therefore,
M(x(t), n(t)) = M(x0, n0) for all t ≥ 0 and the trajectory (x(t), n(t)) follows the
periodic orbit given in Lemma 4.1. 
Proof of Proposition 4.2 - asymptotically stable heteroclinic cycle
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Under the condition (4.6), the four corner fixed points are
saddles and the interior fixed point is unstable. The proof relies on properties of the
characteristic matrix C of the heteroclinic cycle Λ (see Section 2, [42]), which encodes
its stability properties and is constructed as follows.
Observe that X = [0, 1]2 is the intersection of four halfspaces,
X = {x ≥ 0} ∩ {1− n ≥ 0} ∩ {n ≥ 0} ∩ {1− x ≥ 0}.
Define x1 = x, x2 = 1−n, x3 = n, x4 = 1−x. We can write the augmented dynamics
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as (with some abuse of notation for the function g (4.3))
ẋ1 = x1x4g(x1, x2, x3, x4)
ẋ2 = −x2x3(−1 + (1 + θ)x1)
ẋ3 = x2x3(−1 + (1 + θ)x1)
ẋ4 = −x1x4g(x1, x2, x3, x4)






, i, j = 1, 2, 3, 4
where zi is one of the four corner fixed points. We obtain C by following the scheme
below.
x1 x2 x3 x4
(0,0) S0 − P0 0 −1 0
(1,0) S1 − P1 1 0 0
(0,1) 0 0 θ T0 −R0
(1,1) 0 −θ 0 T1 −R1
Under the condition of the Proposition, S0 − P0 > 0, S1 − P1 < 0, T0 − R0 < 0, and
T1 − R1 > 0. Hence, C has positive entries occuring only on the diagonal, and each
row and column contains only one positive entry. Thus, Λ is a simple heteroclinic
cycle [42]. We review some technical conditions for the stability of heteroclinic cycles.
From section 4 in [42], it is required that
• The heteroclinic cycle Λ is a compact invariant subset of ∂X, the boundary of
X.
• Let Λk ⊂ Λ for k = 1, . . . ,m (m is the number of fixed points in Λ) be such
that for each x ∈ Λ, there is a k with ω(x) ⊂ Λk (ω(x) is the ω-limit set of x).
111
The above conditions are satisfied in our case since Λ = ∂X is compact, ∂X is
invariant under the dynamics, and the four corner fixed points serve as the Λk’s. The
stability of Λ invokes the following result from [42]:
Lemma 4.2 (Corollary 1 in [42]). Let Λ be a simple heteroclinic cycle, which is
asymptotically stable within ∂X. (This is automatically satisfied if the cycle is robust
and all Λk are fixed points.) Then C is a square matrix (after elimination of superflu-
ous columns) with positive entries occuring only in the main diagonal (after a suitable
rearrangement of the rows or columns). Let detC 6= 0. If C is not an M-matrix (at
least one leading principal minor is negative) then Λ is asymptotically stable.








Three other dynamical regimes
Here, we will use the Jacobian DF of the system dynamics F , which is given by
DF (x, n) =


(1− 2x)g(x, n) + ∂g
∂x
(n)x(1− x) x(1− x) ∂g
∂n
(x)
n(1− n)(1 + θ) (1− 2n)((1 + θ)x− 1)


At the corner equilibria, we have
DF (0, 0) =


S0 − P0 0
0 −1








DF (0, 1) =


S1 − P1 0
0 1















θ(P0 − S0) + (T0 −R0)




We will consider three cases for the payoff structure of A0: when T0 > R0, S0 > P0
and T0 < R0, S0 < P0.
Case 1: R0 − T0 < 0, S0 − P0 > 0 (regions TOC4 and V1)
In this payoff structure, the game A0 has a mixed Nash at
xm =
S0 − P0
(S0 − P0) + (T0 −R0)
∈ (0, 1)
and From the Jacobian analysis, all corner points are unstable fixed points. The
following result characterizes the stability properties of h.
Theorem 4.1. If xm <
1
1+θ
, (xm, 0) is a stable fixed point (region TOC4). If xm >
1
1+θ
, (xm, 0) is unstable and (x
∗, n∗) is stable (region V2).
Proof. We have








0 (1 + θ)xm − 1

 (4.16)
The eigenvalues λ1, λ2 are the diagonal elements of the above. We already have λ1 < 0
since S0 > P0. To ensure stability, we need (1 + θ)xm − 1 < 0, or when xm < 11+θ .
For the second claim, we have xm >
1
1+θ
, or θ(P0 − S0) + (T0 − R0) < 0. This
ensures that n∗ ∈ (0, 1), since θ(S1 − P1) + (R1 − T1) < 0. Also,







































The fixed point (x∗, n∗) is stable if both eigenvalues have negative real parts. This is




(x∗) < 0. Indeed, from (4.3), we need
∂g
∂x
(n∗) = (1 + θ)
(






θ(S0 − P0) + θ(P1 − S1)
>
θ(S0 − P0)− (T0 −R0)
θ(S0 − P0) + θ(P1 − S1)− (T0 −R0) + (T1 −R1)
By inspection, the above is satisfied and therefore ∂g
∂x







(P0 − S0) + x∗((T0 −R0) + (S0 − P0))
)
< 0





Case 2: R0 − T0 > 0, S0 − P0 < 0 (regions TOC1 and TOC2)
In this payoff structure, the game A0 has a mixed Nash at
xm =
P0 − S0
(P0 − S0) + (R0 − T0)
∈ (0, 1)
From the Jacobian analysis in (4.14), the corner point (0, 0) is stable and remaining
corner points are unstable. The following result characterizes the stability properties
of the other (mixed) equilibria of h.
Theorem 4.2. (xm, 0) and (x
∗, n∗) are unstable fixed points.
Proof. At (xm, 0) the Jacobian have the same structure in (4.16). The first diagonal
element of DF (x, n) in (4.16) is positive in this case, implying λ1 > 0. Hence, (xm, 0)
is unstable.
Second, we consider (x∗, n∗) with the Jacobian in (4.17). First note that if xm >
1
1+θ
then n∗ /∈ (0, 1) by (4.15).
Next, we focus on the case xm <
1
1+θ
, which implies θ(P0−S0) < R0−T0. In this
case, the numerator of n∗ is negative. The denominator of n∗ is a smaller negative
value because θ(S1 − P1) +R1 − T1 < 0 hence n∗ ∈ (0, 1). We consider the condition
dg
dx
(n∗) > 0, which is given by
n∗((P1 − S1) + (S0 − P0)) > S0 − P0, (4.19)
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to show eigenvalues (4.18) are positive. Note here that if P0 − S0 < P1 − S1 then the
left hand side is positive because n∗ > 0. Hence the condition in (4.19) is true. When
the reverse holds, that is, P0 − S0 > P1 − S1, then the condition above becomes
n∗ <
(S0 − P0)
(P1 − S1) + (S0 − P0)
=
θ(P0 − S0)
θ(S1 − P1) + θ(P0 − S0)
Note here that the right hand side is greater than 1 because S1 − P1 < 0. Hence the
condition above holds. Therefore, ∂g
∂x






CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This thesis studied the role of information in three distinct multi-agent systems that
appear in social and biological contexts: 1) collective behaviors, 2) epidemic aware-
ness, and 3) averting tragedies of the commons. In these systems, studying how
information is distributed among the population is essential to understanding why
global behaviors emerge. Our work furthers this understanding in their respective
application domains, and raises important questions for influence and control. We
outline these contributions and insights for the three systems below.
The role of information in collective behavior
Collective behaviors are central aspects of evolutionary biology, microbial decision
making, and animal communication [120, 22]. We showed how information sharing
promotes coordination in collective decision-making. In particular, when the quality
of communication is high, individuals maximize chances to coordinate in fluctuating
environments when they adopt “majority logic” strategies that base decisions on
shared information. Because these strategies were identified from a first principles
approach, they offer insight into the mechanisms that maintain coordinated group
behaviors under the limitations of a noisy communication system. These insights
contribute to advancing core principles of how collective decisions are made.
A potential future application of these principles is the development of alternative
antibiotic therapies. In particular, biofilm formation may be inhibited by disrupt-
ing quorum sensing communication systems in bacteria. Biofilms are extra-cellular
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bacterial structures that have decreased susceptibility to antibiotic drugs and im-
mune responses. In the context of our work, inhibition can conceptually be achieved
by degrading the quality of shared signals, i.e., autoinducer signalling molecules. A
promising approach is to develop synthetic enzymes that break down autoinducers
[71]. However, many questions remain. What stage of infection should such therapies
be implemented? Which pathogenic bacteria can be targeted? Significant further
efforts to develop theoretical and empirical understanding of these complex interac-
tions are necessary before such therapies can be realized [96, 121].
Epidemic awareness
Informed individuals change their social behaviors to prevent getting sick from
infectious diseases [35, 14]. We analyzed to what extent a linear form of individual
awareness mitigates epidemic spreading. Our results point to the effectiveness as
well as limitations of social distancing measures. Specifically, we found that in our
formulation, awareness-induced social distancing alone is insufficient to eradicate an
epidemic, though it lowers the endemic equilibrium state. We also identified local
contact information as the most effective source in slowing the spread of an epidemic,
but not in eradicating the disease. These insights provide a deeper theoretical un-
derstanding of the outcomes of awareness-coupled disease epidemic dynamics, which
can potentially help inform improved epidemic control policies [35, 50]. For example,
disease forecasts can be refined with the help of more realistic model predictions [4],
providing improved guidelines for resource employment for epidemic control. One epi-
demic intervention control measure that gathers local contact information is known
as contact tracing, which involves informing and monitoring the people an infected
individual comes into contact with. This process can be quite challenging, requiring
costly investment on the part of centralized health organizations [6, 18]. At the start
of an outbreak, it is critical to prevent the disease from spreading in the first place.
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This requires a higher order level of awareness and social distancing not captured
in our model. This provides motivation to improve the efficiency of contact tracing
methods and the effectiveness of disease awareness campaigns.
Averting a tragedy of the commons
To sustain common resources, effective strategies to avert a tragedy of the com-
mons are paramount [73, 113]. We showed how a dynamic public opinion can be
influenced to promote the conservation of common resources. In particular, using an
optimal control algorithm to numerically compute locally optimal controls, we found
that these information policies will drive the resource to cycle between replete and
deplete states in order to maximize accumulation of resources over time. These high
variance effects are extremely undesirable because resource abundance is eventually
followed by a collapse. Instead of finding policies that seek to maximize only re-
source abundance over time, a different objective should be specified that promotes
stability of the commons. It remains to identify what types of policies would achieve
this objective in our dynamical formulation. There is general agreement that uti-
lizing a combination of both public information and incentive influence policies may
be required to avert a tragedy of the commons [82]. Additionally, the distinction
between perceived (opinion-dependent) incentives that determine actions and expe-
rienced (environment-dependent) payoffs that determine benefits is not captured in
our model. A challenge for further study is to consider how these experienced payoffs
may affect changes in environmental opinion, and in turn, how opinion control may
be implemented.
Overall, this thesis provides new insights and principled approaches to predict the
dynamical outcomes of complex, multi-agent systems. In doing so, this thesis has
highlighted the role of information, awareness, and feedback, as a means to better
characterize socio-biological multi-agent systems.
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[30] Egúıluz, V. M. and Klemm, K., “Epidemic threshold in structured scale-free
networks,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 89, p. 108701, Aug 2002.
[31] Eksin, C., Shamma, J. S., and Weitz, J. S., “Disease dynamics in a stochas-
tic network game: a little empathy goes a long way in averting outbreaks,”
vol. 7, pp. 44122 EP –, 03 2017.
[32] Franks, N. R., Pratt, S. C., Mallon, E. B., Britton, N. F., and
Sumpter, D. J. T., “Information flow, opinion polling and collective intelli-
gence in house–hunting social insects,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal
Society B: Biological Sciences, vol. 357, no. 1427, pp. 1567–1583, 2002.
[33] Funk, S., Bansal, S., Bauch, C. T., Eames, K. T., Edmunds, W. J.,
Galvani, A. P., and Klepac, P., “Nine challenges in incorporating the dy-
namics of behaviour in infectious diseases models,” Epidemics, vol. 10, no. Sup-
plement C, pp. 21 – 25, 2015. Challenges in Modelling Infectious DIsease Dy-
namics.
122
[34] Funk, S., Gilad, E., Watkins, C., and Jansen, V. A. A., “The spread of
awareness and its impact on epidemic outbreaks,” Proceedings of The National
Academy of Sciences, vol. 106, pp. 6872–6877, 2009.
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[83] Pérez-Escudero, A. and de Polavieja, G. G., “Collective animal behav-
ior from bayesian estimation and probability matching,” PLOS Computational
Biology, vol. 7, pp. 1–14, 11 2011.
[84] Perkins, T. J. and Swain, P. S., “Strategies for cellular decision-making,”
Molecular Systems Biology, vol. 5, no. 1, 2009.
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